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Preface
Self-control problems are a common challenge for many people. People give in to temp-
tation in the moment and overindulge in unhealthy behavior or postpone unpleasant
tasks against their own long-run interests. For example, they are tempted to overeat or
overspend and to procrastinate unpleasant tasks such as dieting or working.
In this dissertation I model three different settings where present-biased preferences have
important economic implications related to the following three questions: Why do people
keep making the same plans and fail? Why do people not seek help to follow through on
their plans? And how might firms respond to consumers with such behaviors?
The first chapter explores the consequences of present-bias in marked interaction between
present-biased consumers and rational firms. The second chapter examines the scope for
overcoming present-bias when agents can construct their own commitment devices. The
third chapter proposes a mechanism for why agents may not even learn about their
present-bias even when given ample learning opportunities. In the following, I give a
summary of the papers and their findings.
Chapter 1: In this chapter, we analyze how firms can choose packaging sizes of tempting
foods to exploit consumers present-bias or help them overcome their present-bias.
We consider the shopping and consumption decision of an individual with a self-control
problem. The consumer believes that restricting the consumption of a sinful product
(such as chips) is in his long-run interest. But when facing the actual decision he is
tempted to overeat. The individual makes a shopping trip before he consumes, but he
can also go shopping when he is tempted to overeat. We ask how firms react to such
self-control problems, and possibly exploit them, by offering different package sizes. In a
1
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competitive market, either one or three package sizes are offered. In contrast to common
intuition, the large, and not the small package might be a commitment device. The latter
may serve to exploit the naive consumer.
A monopolist offers either one package size to cater to the interests of the long run self;
or he offers a small, “commitment"-package for the sophisticated and a large package for
the naive consumer. While the sophisticated consumer receives the same commitment
in the monopolistic and competitive market, the social surplus from the naive consumer
can be lower in the competitive market because the naive consumer goes shopping more
often in competitive markets.
Chapter 2: In this chapter, I suggest a new explanation for why commitment uptake is
rare.
I examine a setting where present-biased agents face stochastic costs and fixed benefits
from completing a task. Agents can take up commitment to attempt to overcome their
present-bias. The commitment devices consist of a fee that agents have to pay if they
do not complete the task. The fee cannot be contingent on the cost realization but the
devices are themselves free and the agent can choose any fee level. Nevertheless, I find
that commitment is rarely optimal even for perfectly sophisticated agents. If the task
is worthwhile for some cost realizations but the expected cost is higher than the benefit
then agents prefer never completing the task over commitment that ensures the task
will always be completed. Therefore, if the agent demands any commitment it is partial
and the agent faces a tradeoff between completing the task only when worthwhile and
incurring the fee with positive probability. This implies, that commitment can be socially
wasteful.
Partial commitment is more likely to be optimal for high variance of costs, it is am-
biguously related to the agent’s (perceived) degree of present-bias. However, demand for
partial commitment is decreasing in present-bias for severe present-bias, while overconfi-
dence can increase the likelihood of taking up commitment.
Chapter 3: In this chapter, we propose an explanation for why present-biased agents do
not learn about their present-bias over time.
2
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We investigate models in which an agent aims to complete a task. While the agent is
initially uncertain about own future self-control, in each period she has an opportunity
to learn about own future self-control by incurring a non-negative (physical or psycho-
logical) cost. If the agent is time-consistent, she always chooses to learn whenever the
learning is beneficial. If the agent has time-inconsistent preferences, however, she may
procrastinate such a learning opportunity. Even when the cost of learning is zero, the
agent may procrastinate if the learning takes time and her preference exhibits an inter-
temporal conflict between future selves (e.g., hyperbolic discounting). We also derive
conditions in which procrastination of learning and non-completion of a task is a unique
equilibrium outcome. When the agent has multiple initially-uncertain attributes (e.g.,
own future self-control and own ability for the task), the agent’s endogenous learning
decisions may be misdirected—she chooses to learn what she should not learn from the
long-run perspective, and she chooses not to learn what she should.
Connection: The papers are tightly connected. They each speak to both the consequences
of present-bias and the difficulties in addressing self-control issues.
Chapter 1 shows both the risks of being unaware of own present-bias (by showing how
naive consumers can be exploited) and the caution policymakers must take if attempting
to regulate markets (it is not necessarily the largest packages of unhealthy foods that
induce overconsumption). The chapter considers a setting where commitment devices
are not available and, therefore, is complemented by Chapter 2 which examines the scope
for commitment. Though the setting described in Chapter 2 differs from that of Chapter 1
both models consider the same intra-personal conflict: the agent’s preferences over a task
or good are time-inconsistent. Chapter 2 considers investment goods rather than leisure
goods and introduces stochastic costs. In this setting, even sophisticated agents may not
benefit from commitment, and therefore, may still incur negative welfare consequences
of present-bias. Chapter 3 bridges the two other chapters by addressing how agents can
stay naive. It thereby shows how sophisticated and naive agents can coexist and therefore
why the behavior of both types are relevant to analyze.
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Chapter 1
Packaging of Sin Goods - Commitment or Exploita-
tion?∗
1.1 Introduction
Many individuals face self-control problems. The pleasure of the moment seduces them
to act against their own long run interests. For example, they are tempted to shirk
on unpleasant tasks – such as dieting. And a poor diet contributes to the problem of
overweight and obesity. The World Health Organization reports that more than 1.4
billion adults were overweight in 2008, and more than half a billion obese. It estimates
that at least 2.8 million people die each year as a result of being overweight or obese.
Moreover, globally, 44 percent of diabetes, 23 percent of ischaemic heart disease and 7-41
percent of certain cancers are attributable to overweight and obesity.1 The associated
health costs are large (cf., e.g., Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Chandon andWansink (2010) discuss how firms influence food intake with their marketing
strategies and thereby may contribute to the problem of overeating. Examples of such
marketing strategies are food prices and promotion, the food’s quality and quantity,
marketing, the availability, salience and convenience of food, the type, size and shape of
serving containers, or the atmospherics of the purchase and consumption environment.
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Julia Nafziger which has already been published under the
same title in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
1 See http : //www.who.int/features/factfiles/obesity/en/index.html (last accessed January
2014).
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In this paper, we want to focus on one particular marketing strategy – the packaging
of sinful products such as chips. Wertenbroch (1998) argues that consumers engage in
pre-commitment by rationing their purchase quantities, i.e., by buying, for example,
small packages. Two questions arise from this. First, can the consumer indeed limit his
consumption through such a strategy? And second, how do firms react to the consumer’s
self-control problem? The argument by Wertenbroch (1998) presumes that firms indeed
offer small packages as commitment devices. But do they indeed do so or are they trying
to counteract the consumer’s wish for commitment?
To answer these questions, we consider the shopping and consumption decision of a vice,
or sinful good (such as chips, cigarettes, or chocolate) of an individual that faces a self-
control problem that arises due to time-inconsistent preferences. The individual judges
that limiting the amount of, say, chips consumption is in his long-run interest. But once
he sits in front of the TV and starts eating chips, the distant health benefits of a healthier
life style suddenly do not seem worth the effort of restricting consumption.
The consumer goes shopping when he is not tempted to overeat. For example, when
doing his weekly shopping trip, the consumer (self 0) has planned beforehand how much
chips to buy and is not hungry. When sitting in front of the TV in the evening, however,
the consumer (self 1) is tempted to overeat chips. The consumer can go shopping at this
point, but, because of opportunity costs, the costs of such spontaneous shopping trips are
higher than those of his weekly, planned shopping trip. We assume that the consumer
is either sophisticated or naive, which means that the consumer, when doing his weekly
shopping trip, is either fully aware or not at all aware that he faces a self-control problem.
Firms offer the consumer to buy a certain quantity (a “package") for a transfer. In
the main model, we consider a competitive market. The sophisticated self 0 perfectly
anticipates the shopping and consumption decision of his future self. Firms respond by
offering self 0 either full or partial commitment. More precisely, if the the shopping costs
of self 1 are large, self 0 buys the package that is optimal from his viewpoint. In this
case, self 1 is not tempted to go shopping again given the package self 0 bought and
so the market can provide full-commitment. If, however, self 1 would be tempted to go
shopping again if self 0 bought the from his viewpoint optimal package, then only partial
5
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commitment is feasible. That is, firms offer a larger package to self 0 than is optimal from
his perspective. Yet, self 0 buys this larger package because he knows that otherwise self
1 would go shopping again to buy a top-up. In contrast to the sophisticated self 0, the
naive self 0 does not anticipate the decision of his future self. Hence, he goes shopping and
buys the package that is optimal from his point of view. If the shopping costs of self 1 are
sufficiently large, then self 1 will not go shopping. So in this case, self 1 will consume the
package that is optimal from the point of view of self 0, i.e., the naive consumer receives
full commitment. If, however, the shopping costs of self 1 are not sufficiently large, self 1
will go shopping again and buys a “top-up" package. So in this case, commitment breaks
down.
The result yields several implications and testable predictions. First, we predict that
commitment is easier to achieve if self 1 faces large shopping costs. There is some evidence
that supports this result. Hinnosaar (2012) predicts that Sunday sales restriction should
decrease weekend consumption of alcohol. When looking at an actual policy change,
Bernheim et al. (2012) however observe no such effect. Currie et al. (2010) observe that
a close geographical proximity of a fast food restaurant is associated with higher rates of
obesity (of children and pregnant women). Leung et al. (2011) show that the availability
of convenience stores within a close distance of residence is correlated with a greater
risk of girls becoming overweight or obese. Lee (2012) however finds conflicting evidence
regarding the association between distance and overweight.
Second, the result predicts that in the competitive market, if the shopping costs of self
1 are large relative to those of self 0, one package size is offered, which is tailored to the
interests of self 0. If the shopping costs at time 1 are relatively small, three different
package sizes (a small one, a medium one, and a large one) are offered, and thus the
market does not offer commitment to the naive consumers. Consistent with this result
Steenhuis et al. (2010) observe that firms offer different package sizes. In contrast to com-
mon intuition, we demonstrate that the small package is not necessarily a commitment
device, but can serve to exploit the naive consumer, while the large package may offer
commitment to the sophisticated consumers. Indeed, for empirically reasonable values of
the self-control problem, the smallest package is always the exploitative.
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Third, in a competitive market, the naive consumer may go inefficiently often shopping.
He initially buys a relatively small package that is optimal from the point of view of self
0 – believing that he will only consume this package, i.e., not go shopping again. But
later, when in the “hot state", he buys another top-up package. Indeed, Hinnosaar (2012)
observes that time-inconsistent consumers go shopping more often than time-consistent
consumer. And Vermeer et al. (2011) provide field evidence showing that people having
a smaller portion in the lunch cafeteria later buy more other food.
We contrast the competitive market with a monopolistic one. When facing a naive
consumer, the monopolist tailors the package to the preferences of the self from whom he
can extract the highest surplus. Thus, if the shopping costs of self 1 are large relative to
the shopping costs of self 0, he caters to self 0 and perfect commitment is possible. If not,
he caters to the interests of self 1 and offers a relatively large package. The sophisticated
self 0 is willing to pay for a smaller commitment-package. The monopolist offers such
(partial or full) commitment products to the sophisticated consumer – possibly at a higher
price. Thus, in a monopolistic market, small packages are always commitment devices.
So overall, our results make clear that a careful market analysis and assessment of the
self-control problem are needed to assess whether small packages are commitment devices
or are exploitative.
Comparing the monopolistic to the competitive market shows that for the sophisticated
consumer only the distribution of rents differs, but the social surplus is the same in
both markets. In contrast, the naive individual might be better or worse off in the
competitive market. On the one hand, the competitive market provides more often full
commitment to the naive consumer than the monopolistic market. However, if he does
not receive full commitment, the social surplus in the competitive market can be lower
than in the monopolistic market because the naive consumer goes shopping too often in
the competitive market. Thus, competition can decrease the social surplus.
Finally, we consider some robustness checks and extensions to our main analysis. We
show that our results are robust to relaxing some of the more technical assumptions and
robust to allowing for partial naïveté. We also extend the model – allowing for imperfect
competition and market entry. In this setting, firms operate on two separate markets: one
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that caters self 0 and one that caters self 1. This can be seen as reflecting the difference
between offering a product in standard supermarkets, or in late night convenience stores.
Related theoretical literature The theme that firms provide commitment to the sophis-
ticated consumer, but exploit the naive consumer is well established in this literature
on contracting with time-inconsistent agents. Our paper is distinct by the application
and the repeated setting it studies: package sizes in consumer markets with re-shopping
possibilities have been underexplored – and some new features arise in such a setting.
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) consider a model in which firms offer two-part tariffs
consisting of a lump-sum payment and per-unit price to a time-inconsistent consumer.
They establish that firms price investment goods below marginal costs, and leisure goods
above. Gottlieb (2008) relaxes the assumption of DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004)
that a consumer deals exclusively with one firm (for a similar model see also Kőszegi,
2005). The assumption of a competitive spot market is more realistic in, e.g., markets
for consumption goods such as sinful products. He shows that in this case marginal
cost pricing of sinful products arises, i.e., commitment for the sophisticated consumers
vanishes. Our paper demonstrates that the market may provide commitment under some
circumstances – to both sophisticated and naive consumers. Gottlieb (2008) also shows
that competition can decrease the social surplus. In our model, this is the case for the
naive, but not for the sophisticated consumer. Heidhues and Kőszegi (2010) consider a
competitive credit market. They show that firms exploit naive consumers by offering a
cheap baseline repayment, and specifying large penalties for late payments.2
A small literature strand in marketing asks about the package sizes firms provide when
consumers face self-control problems. Dobson and Gerstner (2010) show why it can be
profitable for firms to offer so-called “super-size" portions, i.e., very large portions which
are not much more expensive than the normal sized portion. Firms employ such a strategy
2A number of papers focuses on the question how to screen agents who differ in their degree of
sophistication, or in their degree of time-inconsistency (see, e.g., Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006, 2008;
Esteban and Miyagawa, 2006; Esteban et al., 2007; Galperti, 2012). The theme that relatively
sophisticated types receive full commitment, while relatively naive types are exploited re-appears
when firms screen agents who differ in their degree of sophistication (see, e.g., Eliaz and Spiegler,
2006, 2008).
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in order to price-discriminate between disciplined and tempted consumers. The former
are willing to pay a premium for smaller sized portions. Jain (2012) considers, similar
to our setting, the shopping decision of an individual with a present bias. The main
difference is that in his framework only self 0 can go shopping, and consumption occurs
on two days. The package size and number of package sizes are exogenous in his setting,
while it is endogenous in ours. A small package thus is by assumption a commitment
device in his model and its introduction increases the social surplus. Firms introduce
small packages if the gain from doing so (attracting consumers who would otherwise not
buy or buy less) outweighs the loss (some consumers buy less). Jain (2012) also briefly
considers naive consumers, but as only self 0 can go shopping, exploitation by firms of
naive consumers is not an issue.
Hinnosaar (2012) builds up a model of the behavior of a time-inconsistent consumer
related to the one considered here. Her main aim is to identify time-consistent and time-
inconsistent consumers from dynamic purchasing behavior, but she does not disentangle
naive and sophisticated consumers. And she does not consider firm behavior as we do in
this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the model in section 2.3. The main
analysis and results are presented in section 1.3. In this section, we first consider the
competitive market and then the monopolistic one. Section 1.4 discusses robustness and
extensions. Section 1.5 concludes the paper.
1.2 Model
There is a continuum of firms who operate in a competitive market and a continuum of
consumers (with unit mass one).3 In each period τ ∈ {0, 1}, firms offer the consumer a
schedule, i.e., a quantity-transfer pair (xτ , tτ ) that specifies for every quantity xτ ∈ R+0 ,
a (possibly negative) transfer tτ ∈ R from the consumer to the firm. Firms make these
3 The assumption that there is a continuum of consumers is not crucial for the baseline model, but
ensures that models in which the distribution of types of consumers play a role (see section 1.4) can
easily be build on top of the existing framework.
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Type True preferences Beliefs about Actions
preferences at τ = 0
τ = 0 Naive u(x) u(x) Shop x0 ≥ 0
Sophisticates u(x) u(x) if x0 > 0:
incur cost k0
τ = 1 Naive v(x) u(x) Shop x1 ≥ 0
Sophisticates v(x) v(x) if x1 > 0:
incur cost k1
consume x0 + x1
Table 1.1: Overview of types, preferences, beliefs and actions
offers in a given period simultaneously. In each period, firms observe which contracts
have been offered previously. A firm’s cost of producing x units is c x. The profits of the
firm are
Π(x0, x1, t0, t1) = t0 + t1 − c (x0 + x1).
In period 0, the consumer has the opportunity to go shopping. In period 1, the consumer
can go shopping again and consumption takes place. Shopping trips are costly. The
consumer incurs a monetary cost kτ for a shopping trip in period τ . We assume that
k1 ≥ k0 = 0. The timing and consumers’ beliefs are summarized in table 1.1.
The consumer faces a self-control problem, i.e., the consumer’s preferences regarding
consumption change between periods 0 and 1. The date 0 incarnation of the consumer will
be called self 0, and the date 1 incarnation will be called self 1. In period 0, the consumer’s
utility from consuming some quantity x is u(x), while in period 1 the preferences have
changed to ν(x). The consumer has quasi-linear preferences over consumption and the
transfer/shopping costs. That is, self 0’s utility function is given by:
U(x0, x1, t0, t1, k1) = u(x0 + x1)− t0 − t1 − k1.
And the one of self 1 is:
V (x0, x1, t1, k1) = v(x0 + x1)− t1 − k1.
10
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Both u(x) and ν(x) are strictly increasing and concave functions, implying u′(x), v′(x) > 0
and u′′(x), v′′(x) < 0. Further, v(0) = u(0) = 0. If the consumer does not consume, he
receives the reservation utility u¯ = 0.4 5
From the perspective of self 0, let the surplus maximizing quantity6 be given by:
x∗0 = arg maxx u(x)− c x,
and from the perspective of self 1:
x∗1 = arg maxx v(x)− c x.
We are interested in the case where the good is a harmful vice good, such as chips, or
cigarettes. Self 0 prefers a lower consumption than self 1. Assuming v(x) > u(x)∀x and
v′(x) > u′(x)∀x implies x∗1 > x∗0, i.e., there is a conflict of interest between self 0 and self
1.
Consumers can be either naive or sophisticated about their future preferences. The
consumer believes that his future preferences are captured by the utility function vˆ(x).
If vˆ(x) = v(x) the consumer is fully sophisticated and if vˆ(x) = u(x) he is fully naive.7
Partial naïveté does not change the main insights and is briefly discussed in section 1.4).
We assume that firms know u(x), v(x) and vˆ(x). Relaxing the assumption that firms
know the degree of sophistication does not change our results as we discuss in section 1.4.
Furthermore, we assume that gains from trade are positive, i.e., v(x∗1)− c x∗1−k1 > 0 and
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 > 0.
4Allowing for u¯ > 0, or k0 > 0 does not change results. What matters is the difference between u¯+k1
and u¯+ k0.
5 These preferences capture in a stylized way present biased preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999). For example, the consumption of x units of the good causes immediate benefits
of b(x) and delayed costs of κ(x). Self 0 weighs these costs equally, i.e., u(x) = b(x) − κ(x). Self 1
attaches, due to his present bias, β ∈ (0, 1), a larger relative weight to the current benefits than to
the delayed costs, i.e., v(x) = b(x)− β κ(x).
6 That is, the quantity that maximizes U(x0, x1, t0, t1, k1) + Π(x0, x1, t0, t1).
7We have a further implicit assumption; that consumers do not infer anything about own (changing)
preferences from the quantity-transfer contracts on the market.
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The setup captures the idea that in period 0 the individual does his (weekly) shopping
trip. At this date, he is in a cold state and not tempted to overeat the harmful product
(such as chips). In period 1, when sitting in front of the TV, he is in a hot state, and
prefers to eat more chips than is optimal from the long run perspective. He can go
shopping at this date, but at this point in time the opportunity costs of a shopping trip
are higher than for the weekly shopping trip. For example, buying chips in the shop
around the corner just before the movie starts causes higher costs than buying them
along with other goods on a planned, weekly shopping trip.8
Competitive equilibrium As usual in the literature, we define the competitive equilib-
rium in terms of the contracts that survive competitive pressure. A contract is a quantity-
transfer pair. Consumers apply for at most one contract and if their participation con-
straint is satisfied, they choose the contract that yields the highest utility to them (if
indifferent they randomize 50-50). In each period, they can choose a different contract
from a different firm. Each equilibrium contract earns zero expected profits, and there
exists no profitable deviation in any period that is accepted by a consumer and that yields
strictly positive expected profits. Each contract offered is purchased by some consumers.
We assume that firms produce on the spot. Thus, firms can react to a deviation of a firm
in the current period in later periods. In section 1.4, we discuss the robustness of the
results to this assumption.
1.3 Analysis
We start by analyzing the case of naive consumers and then sophisticated consumers in a
setting of perfect competition before contrasting these results to the case of a monopoly.
1.3.1 Naive consumers
Suppose self 0 bought some quantity x0. Self 1 has to decide whether he is satisfied with
this quantity, or whether he wants to incur the costs of an additional shopping trip and
8 The assumption that costs are higher in period 1 than in period 0 could also reflect psychological
costs, such as a bad conscience for an additional shopping trip.
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pay the transfer to get the additional quantity x1. So he goes shopping whenever the
following participation constraint is satisfied:
PC1 v(x0 + x1)− k1 − t1 ≥ v(x0). (1.1)
Since it will often be of interest when the participation constraint of self 1 is not satisfied,
we will use the notation (NPC1) when referring to the constraint that self 1 will not go
shopping. The naive self 0 believes that his consumption plan coincides with the one of
self 1. This means that self 0 does not anticipate that self 1 will possibly go shopping.
Hence, the naive self 0 goes shopping whenever the following participation constraint is
satisfied:
PCN0 u(x0)− t0 ≥ 0. (1.2)
Contract for self 1 A firm’s problem in period 1 is to maximize its profits subject to the
participation constraint of the consumer.
max
t1,x1
t1 − c x1 s.t. (PC1) v(x0 + x1)− k1 − t1 ≥ max{v(x0), v¯∗}. (1.3)
Competition affects the outside option of the consumer. If he does not buy from a specific
firm, he can buy from another firm. Thus, in a competitive market, the outside option
is determined endogenously. Specifically, utility level v¯∗ is the perceived utility from the
(equilibrium) contract. Since we are in a competitive setting, the maximized profit of
each firm must be zero, i.e., t1 = c x1. In the optimization problem the level v¯∗ ensures
that this zero profit condition holds: v∗ = v(x0 + x1) − k1 − t1 = v(x0 + x1) − k1 − c x1
for the equilibrium quantity x1.
In the appendix, we show that the solution to this problem is to sell x1 = x∗1 − x0 at
t1 = c (x∗1−x0), whenever v(x∗1)− c x∗1− k1 ≥ v(x0)− c x0, and 0 otherwise. When selling
x1 = x∗1 − x0 to self 1, he will consume his preferred quantity x0 + x1 = x∗1. That is,
the utility of self 1 is maximized. The transfer ensures that firms make zero profits. The
condition v(x∗1) − c x∗1 − k1 ≥ v(x0) − c x0 is satisfied whenever self 1 finds it optimal to
buy the equilibrium quantity at the respective transfer.
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Contract for the naive self 0 We first argue that in any competitive equilibrium the
naive self 0 goes shopping. If this were not the case, a firm had an incentive to deviate
and offer self 0, say, x∗0 defined by u′(x∗0) = c for a transfer t0 = u(x∗0). The naive self
0, who is not aware that self 1 shall possibly go shopping, accepts such an offer and the
offer yields strictly positive profits for a firm. Thus, in a competitive equilibrium, the
participation constraint of the naive self 0 cannot be violated and the period-0 contract
for the naive consumer solves
max
t0,x0
t0 − c x0 s.t. (PCN0 ) u(x0)− t0 ≥ u¯∗. (1.4)
Again, utility level u¯∗ is the perceived utility from the equilibrium contract. The solution
is to offer (x∗0, c x∗0) in period 0. The naive self 0 accepts this offer.
1.3.2 Sophisticated consumers
In contrast to the naive, the sophisticated self 0 perfectly anticipates the consumption and
shopping decision of his future self. We hence use a backward induction approach to derive
the participation constraints. Suppose self 0 does not go shopping in period 0. Then self
1 would accept (x1, t1) if v(x1)−k1− t1 ≥ 0. More generally, the participation constraint
of sophisticated and naive consumers coincide at date 1, i.e., (PC1) is also the relevant
constraint for the sophisticated self 1. Contract (x1, t1) yields utility u(x1) − t1 − k1
to self 0. Hence, the sophisticated self 0 accepts contracts which satisfy the following
participation constraint
PCS0 u(x0)− t0 ≥ u(x1)− t1 − k1, (1.5)
where (x1, t1) must be such that the participation constraint of self 1, (PC1) (with x0 = 0)
holds and where x0 must be such that self 1 does not go shopping. This means that for
any profitable (x′1, t′1) it must hold that
NPC1 v(x0) ≥ v(x0 + x′1)− k1 − t′1. (1.6)
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The intuition is as follows: The sophisticated consumer will know of the change in prefer-
ences, and therefore never buy a quantity x0 so small, that there exists a quantity-transfer
pair (x′1, t′1) such that self 1 will go shopping. Such a behavior would yield to additional
shopping costs which the sophisticated self 0 could avoid by buying the total desired quan-
tity immediately. Thus, (NPC1) cannot be violated. But at the same time self 0 will
never buy a quantity x0 if he would have a higher utility from the expected equilibrium
contract at date 1. This is what (PCS0 ) states.
Contract for self 1 While in equilibrium the sophisticated self 1 will never go shopping,
we have to specify which contract firms offered him if he, off the equilibrium-path, were
to go shopping. As the participation constraint for the naive and sophisticated consumer
coincide in period 1, the optimization problem of a firm is identical to the one for the
naive consumer, i.e., to (1.3). Again the solution to this problem is to sell x1 = x∗1 − x0
at t1 = c (x∗1 − x0), whenever v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 ≥ v(x0)− c x0, and 0 otherwise.
Contract for the sophisticated self 0 Self 0 anticipates that if self 1 went shopping, he
would consume x∗1 in total. Selling self 0 such a low quantity that self 1 goes shopping
could not, however, be a competitive equilibrium. As the shopping costs of self 0 are
lower than those of self 1, firms could increase profits by selling the desired quantity to
self 0 rather than to self 1. Thus, in any competitive equilibrium, only the sophisticated
self 0, not self 1 goes shopping. So the competitive equilibrium is characterized by the
solution to the following optimization problem:
max
t0,x0
t0 − c x0 (1.7)
s.t. (PCS0 ) u(x0)− t0 ≥ u¯∗,
s.t. (NPC1) v(x0) ≥ v(x∗1)− c (x∗1 − x0)− k1.
Utility level u¯∗ is the perceived utility from the equilibrium contract. Suppose first that
v(x∗0)− c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)− c x∗1− k1. Then self 1 would never go shopping when self 0 bought
x∗0, and hence the solution to the above problem is x∗0, defined by u′(x∗0) = c, t0 = c x∗0.
Suppose next that self 1 would go shopping if self 0 bought only x∗0. Then the “no-
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shopping" constraint, (NPCS1 ), has to be binding. Otherwise a firm had an incentive
to deviate and lower x0 by an ε. The lower offer is more attractive for self 0, and self
1 would, for ε small, still not go shopping. Hence, the optimal solution xS0 is defined
by v(xS0 ) − c xS0 = v(x∗1) − c x∗1 − k1, and t0 = c xS0 . So overall, firms offer (partial)
commitment to the sophisticated self 0. Specifically, selling self 0 the quantity desired
by self 1, x∗1 for t1 = c x∗1, cannot be a competitive equilibrium. Suppose it were. Then
a firm could deviate and offer self 0 some quantity x0 ∈ [x∗0, x∗1) and a transfer t0, such
that u(x0) − t0 ≥ u(x∗1) − c x∗1. Such an offer raises the utility of self 0 if the quantity
is such that self 1 would not go shopping in period 1. Consider, e.g., x0 = x∗1 − ε and
note that v(x∗1) > v(x∗1) − t1 − k1. Offering x0 = x∗1 − ε implies that, by continuity,
v(x∗1 − ε) > v(x∗1)− t1 − k1.
Proposition 1.1.
1. The competitive equilibrium contract for the naive individual is (x∗0, c x∗0), which he
buys in period 0. If, in addition, PC1 is satisfied: v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 ≥ v(x∗0)− c x∗0,
then firms offer contract (x∗1 − x∗0, c (x∗1 − x∗0)), which self 1 buys in period 1.
2. The competitive equilibrium contract for the sophisticated individual is (xS0 , c xS0 ),
where xS0 ∈ [x∗0, x∗1) is defined by v(xS0 )− c xS0 = v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1, which he buys in
period 0. If v(x∗0)− c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1, then xS0 = x∗0.
In the competitive market, either 1 or 3 different package sizes are offered. If v(x∗0) −
c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1) − c x∗1 − k1, then both the naive and the sophisticated consumers receive
full commitment and only a package of size x∗0 is offered. If this does not hold, then 3
packages are offered: a large package, a medium package and a small package. In the
appendix, we provide some details on the ranking of the packages sizes. We demonstrate
that for empirical reasonable values of the self-control problem the ranking is in contrast
to common intuition. Specifically, for such values the largest package is xS1 , i.e., the
package that offers commitment to the sophisticated consumer. The small package is
x∗0 − x∗1 and thus not a commitment device, but serves to exploit the naive consumer.
The naive consumer initially does not buy the biggest package (xS1 ) but the medium one
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x∗0 – believing that he will stick to this quantity. But later, when in the “hot state" he
buys a small top-up (x∗0 − x∗1). This results in inefficiently high shopping costs.
1.3.3 Monopolist
The monopolist maximizes his profits, t0 + t1 − c (x0 + x1) subject to the respective
participation constraints. For the sophisticated consumer, optimization problem (1.7) is
unchanged, except for the reservation utility of self 0. Thus, as in the competitive market,
self 0 receives either full or partial commitment. What changes is the transfer, which is
given by t0 = u(x0)− u(x∗1) + v(x∗1) ≡ u(x0)− u¯S, x0 ∈ {x∗0, xS0 }.9
Consider next the naive consumer. Unlike firms in the competitive market, the monop-
olist can commit to sell to only one of the selves. He maximizes profits subject to the
participation constraint of self 0 and/or self 1. As we show in the appendix, the monop-
olist never finds it optimal to sell a positive quantity to both selves. That is, he either
caters to self 0 (by selling x∗0), or self 1 (by selling x∗1). Whether it is optimal to cater to
the interest of self 0 or self 1 depends on whether v(x∗1)−c x∗1−k1 is smaller or larger than
u(x∗0)− c x∗0. While the sophisticated self 0 always does all the shopping, the naive self 0
never buys x∗1 and thus self 1 does the shopping in case it is optimal for the monopolist
to cater self 1. This is due to the naïveté of the consumer. Self 0 does not anticipate
that self 1 will buy x∗1. Thus, at time 0, he will not buy x∗1 even if that could safe him
the higher shopping costs k1 at time 1. Thus, in this case, naïveté results in inefficiently
high shopping costs.
Proposition 1.2.
1. If v(x∗1) − c x∗1 − k1 ≥ u(x∗0) − c x∗0 the monopolist offers contract (x∗1, t∗1), with
t∗1 = v(x∗1) − k1 to the naive consumer, who goes shopping in period 1. If u(x∗0) −
c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1) − c x∗1 − k1 the monopolist offers contract (x∗0, t∗0), t∗0 = u(x∗0) to the
naive consumer, who goes shopping in period 0.
9 Consider the subgame following a rejection of self 0 in period 0. In this subgame, the monopolist
maximizes his profits by offering quantity x∗1 at transfer t1 = v(x∗1) − k1. Self 1 accepts such an
offer. This yields utility u(x∗1) − v(x∗1) to self 0. Thus, self 0 accepts contracts with u(x0) − t0 ≥
u(x∗1)− v(x∗1)⇔ u(x0)− u(x∗1) + v(x∗1) ≥ t0 given that v(x0) ≥ v(x∗1)− c (x∗1 − x0)− k1.
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2. If v(x∗0)−c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)−c x∗1−k1 the monopolist offers contract (x∗0, tS0 ), tS0 = u(x∗0)−
u¯S to the sophisticated consumer. Otherwise he offers (xS0 , tS0 ), tS0 = u(xS0 )− u¯S and
xS0 defined by v(xS0 )− c xS0 = v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1.
Hence, the monopolist either offers one package size (x∗0), which provides perfect commit-
ment to both types of consumers. Such perfect commitment is possible if the shopping
costs of self 1 are large. Or he offers a small and a large package (either the pair (x∗0, x∗1)
or the pair (xS0 , x∗1) depending on whether or not perfect commitment for the sophisti-
cated consumer is possible). Thus, in a monopolistic market, small packages are always
commitment devices for sophisticated consumers.
The solution for the sophisticated consumer is identical in the monopolistic and compet-
itive market. Only the distribution of rents differs. Thus, the social surplus is the same.
What about the naive consumer? He receives full commitment more often in the compet-
itive market than in the monopolistic market. If, however, v(x∗1)−c x∗1−k1 ≥ v(x∗0)−c x∗0,
so that not only self 0, but also self 1 goes shopping in the competitive market, then the
total quantity consumed is equal in the monopolistic and the competitive market, but
total shopping costs are higher in the competitive market. Thus, the social surplus is
lower in the competitive than in the monopolistic market as the naive consumer goes
shopping too often in the competitive market.10
1.4 Extensions and robustness
In the following section we wish to explore what happens if the model is extended in
different ways. First, we discuss robustness to relaxing the assumptions of an observable
degree of sophistication, on-the-spot-production and to allowing for partial naïveté. We
do so for the competitive market.11 Then we will look at the number of firms and degree
10 Comparing the sophisticated and the naive consumer in the monopolistic market shows that the
social surplus generated from the sophisticated consumer is larger than the one for the naive self
0. The monopolist offers full commitment to the sophisticated self 0 whenever v(x∗0) − c x∗0 ≥
v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 and partial commitment otherwise. In contrast, the naive individual receives full
commitment whenever u(x∗0)− c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)− c x∗1−k1, i.e., as v(x∗0)− c x∗0 > u(x∗0)− c x∗0, less often
than the sophisticated individual.
11 For the monopolistic market, we discuss the robustness of the results to the assumption that firms
know the degree of sophistication and on-the-spot-production in the appendix. The arguments for
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of competition.
1.4.1 Relaxing the assumption of observable degree of sophistication
The assumption that firms in the competitive market can distinguish between the naive
and the sophisticated consumer is not crucial. Suppose three packages are offered. The
commitment quantity xS0 at the given transfer is not attractive for the naive consumer
as he does not demand commitment. And x∗1 − x∗0 and x∗0 are not attractive for the
sophisticated consumer as they would induce overconsumption. If one package size (x∗0)
is offered, then it is offered at the same transfer to the sophisticated and naive consumer.
1.4.2 Relaxing the assumption of on-the-spot-production
The assumption that firms produce on the spot and can thus react to a period-0-deviation
in period 1 neither drives the results for the sophisticated consumer if perfect commitment
is feasible, nor for the naive consumer. In all these cases, no firm had an incentive to
deviate – independent of what will happen in period 1. If however the sophisticated
consumer receives only partial commitment, i.e., xS0 , the assumption matters. Self 0
would prefer to buy a lower quantity than xS0 – but only if he knew that self 1 would
not go shopping. In the model with on-the-spot-production, firms can, in reaction to a
period-0-deviation of some firm to say some lower quantity than xS0 , offer self 1 a quantity
that makes a shopping trip attractive. Anticipating this, self 0 would not buy the lower
quantity and a deviation would not pay off.
If however firms could not react in period 1, the threat to sell self 1 some quantity might
not be credible anymore. And if self 0 knew that self 1 would not go shopping, then
he would buy the lower quantity from the deviating firm. But even if firms could not
react to the deviation by tailoring a package for self 1, self 1 might still go shopping
and buy one of the other available packages (x∗1 − x∗0, x∗0, or xS0 ). Anticipating this self
0 would not buy from the deviating firm. So if there exists no x∗0 ≤ x0 < xS0 , such that
v(x0) > max{v(x0+x∗0)−c x∗0, v(x0+xS0 )−c xS0 , v(x0+x∗1−x∗0)−c (x∗1−x∗0)}−k1, offering
the former case are more involved, but the main insights are robust.
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package xS0 is still a competitive equilibrium. If this condition fails to hold, a firm has an
incentive to deviate, and no competitive equilibrium exists.
1.4.3 Partial naïveté
In the main model we assume that there are two types of consumers: perfectly naive,
and perfectly sophisticated consumers, implying vˆ(x) ∈ {u(x), v(x)}. In this section,
we wish to explore if our main findings are robust to allow for partial naïveté. To do
this we will assume vˆ(x) can be anything between u(x) and v(x). The details can be
found in the appendix. The implication is that consumers are aware of their self-control
problem, but all except the perfectly sophisticated consumers underestimate the severity.
This means that consumers are willing to pay for commitment, as we have shown in
the baseline model. As in the baseline model, if x∗0 is sufficient to prevent perfectly
naive consumers from shopping at time 1, all consumers receive full commitment. This
is an intuitive extension of the baseline model. If x∗0 is sufficient to prevent the fully
naive consumer from shopping at time 1, then the quantity also prevents partially naive
consumers from shopping. If, on the other hand, x∗0 is not sufficiently big, then partially
naive consumers do not buy a sufficiently large quantity to avoid shopping at time 1.
Therefore, the consumers ends up consuming x∗1 but having paid more than v(x∗1) − k1,
making them worse off than even the perfectly naive consumers. In fact, the closer to
perfectly sophisticated, the greater the exploitation.
Thus, the result of (partially) naive consumers’ too frequent shopping goes through. Yet,
if there is a continuum of possible degrees of naïveté, then firms offer a continuum of
quantities. Introducing a (plausible) fixed cost of offering a quantity-transfer pair into
the model restores however a finite number of packages.12
12 If we maintain the assumption of perfect competition, the number of offers will be such that the the
marginal consumer of a quantity will be indifferent between buying and not entering the market,
that is, even with perfect competition, the marginal consumer will not be left with any rents. In this
setting, there will exist some level of sophistication such that all consumers at least as sophisticated
as the cutoff will receive at least partial commitment, that is, the marginally naive will no longer
be the most exploited.
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1.4.4 Circle model
We now look at what happens if we change the competitive setting and allow for imperfect
competition and market entry. To do this we will use the circular city model first presented
by Salop (1979). In this setting, consumers are distributed uniformly along a circle where
firms, when entering, choose a locations. This setting alters the nature of consumers’
shopping costs in that the shopping costs now not only depend on the parameter kτ but
also on the distance θ to a firm. We assume that firms occur some fixed cost of entry
into the market. Details can be found in the appendix.
Since we now have a fixed cost of entry, each firm must in either period serve a fraction
of consumers and not just one individual for entry to be profitable. Hence if a type of
consumers constitutes too small a fraction of consumers, it is no longer be possible to
target them. If we abstract from this case, the results of the main model goes through:
sophisticated consumers always receive at least partial commitment, and naive consumers
are sometimes offered commitment, but only if x∗0 is sufficient to prevent shopping at time
1. The new aspect in this model is entry. Generally the fixed cost of entry along with free
entry will drive prices up even if no firm makes positive profits, and in equilibrium entry
is above the socially optimal level. This is not specific to our setting, but is a general
result from the circle model.
What is specific about this setting is that each firm compete over consumers in either of
the two periods. That is, firms operate on two separate markets: the one at time 0 and
the one at time 1. This can be seen as reflecting the difference between offering a product
in standard supermarkets, or in late night convenience stores.
1.5 Conclusion
The paper considers the shopping and consumption decision of an individual who faces
a self-control problem. It asks how firms react to consumers’ self-control problems, and
possibly exploit them, by offering different package sizes. In a monopolistic market, small
packages are commitment devices. In a competitive market, small packages may not be
commitment devices, but, quite to the contrary, can serve to exploit naive consumers,
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who go (unexpectedly) frequently shopping. Further, the paper shows that while the
sophisticated consumer receives the same commitment in the monopolistic and competi-
tive market, the social surplus from the naive consumer can be lower in the competitive
market because the naive consumer goes shopping more often in competitive markets.
Our model is consistent with recent results in the literature that suggest positive welfare
effects of restricting sales times or locations of sinful products ( see e.g., Beshears et al.,
2006; Hinnosaar, 2012). Such policies increase k1 and therefore make commitment easier
to achieve, i.e., firms are less likely to offer products that cater the interests of the short-
run self. Care should however be taken when restricting package sizes or subsidizing
small packages. Depending on the market environment and the extend of the consumers’
self-control problem, a large package can either be a commitment device or can serve the
interests of the short-run self. Thus, a careful market analysis would be needed to decide
which one is the case.
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Chapter 2
The limited Potential of Partial-Commitment
2.1 Introduction
An extensively studied behavioral bias is present-bias: People’s tendency to value the now
disproportionately over the future. This bias implies that agents have time-inconsistent
preferences, that is, agents may experience preference reversal. To overcome the issue
of preference reversal, agents may take up commitment to (partially) commit themselves
to a certain action. However, commitment is empirically rare1 which poses the question:
why do present-biased agents not demand commitment?
Commitment devices are devices or contracts that seek to align an agent’s long-run and
short-run preferences2 or restrict the short-run agent’s choice set. In the literature, agents
who are aware of their present-bias are referred to as sophisticates and agents who are
not, as naifs. If agents are naive, they are unaware that they have a self-control issue and
therefore see no benefits to a commitment device. The natural conclusion would be that
people are often naive while rarely sophisticated. In this paper, I will argue that even if
agents are perfectly informed about their present-bias, they are often unlikely to take up
commitment.
In my model, agents are faced with a task which has immediate (stochastic) cost and
(fixed) delayed benefits. Agents know the cost distribution, but cannot contract on
1 See Bryan et al. (2010) for an overview.
2 This paper will only deal with quasi-hyperbolic discounting, or the so-called, β − δ-model, and not
general hyperbolic discounting or any other types of time-inconsistent preferences.
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cost realizations. Therefore, the best the agents can do is to impose a punishment on
themselves if they fail to complete the task. However, if there are cost realizations for
which the cost outweighs the benefit even for a time-consistent agent, the agent is facing
a tradeoff. Either ensure the task is only completed when the benefit is higher than the
cost, but then incur the punishment with positive probability, or complete the task no
matter the cost,even when the cost outweighs the benefit with positive probability.
Therefore, I focus on partial commitment, which here is defined as commitment that only
ensures the task will be completed for some and not all cost realizations. The alternatives
to partial commitment are no or full commitment, but I also introduce the term perfect
commitment, which I define as commitment that perfectly aligns an agent’s long-run and
short-run preferences and thereby ensures that a time-inconsistent agent behaves as a
time-consistent agent would. I also allow for agents to have a distribution of beliefs over
their present bias. This modeling choice allows me to explore not only the importance of
overconfidence but also underconfidence and precision in beliefs.
To my knowledge, this paper is the first to look at commitment devices with a socially
wasteful component and this leads to even perfectly sophisticated agents optimally choos-
ing non-perfect commitment devices. This is an important result since it implies that
fully sophisticated agents may behave differently from time-consistent agents, even if they
have taken up commitment. Therefore, seeing different behavior is not necessarily proof
that an agent is partially naive and has picked the wrong commitment. I also find that
if agents can make complete contracts, that is, contract on realized costs, commitment
devices are attractive if agents know their present bias, but if costs are not contractable,
agents only have the choice of taking up simple commitment contracts where agents have
to pay a fee if they fail to complete a task, commitment uptake becomes costly.
To fix ideas imagine a simple everyday task that requires immediate effort with delayed
benefits, for instance, going for a run. I start with perfectly sophisticated agents, and
then analyze the implication of allowing for partial naïveté, which is often proposed as
an explanation for little demand for commitment (For an overview, see Bryan et al., 2010
for an overview). One of the few suppliers of commitment devices is www.StickK.com
— which is a company founded by behavioral economists. On this webpage you set a
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goal, (potentially) choose a punishment or add additional pressure from getting a referee
and/or add friends.
Overall, my contribution is threefold: I propose a simple explanation for the limited
commitment uptake – that commitment can be socially wasteful and therefore often un-
desirable, that commitment uptake is non-monotonically related to the degree of present-
bias, and that agents have limited value of knowing their exact present-bias – offering a
potentially explanation for why naïveté is empirically prevalent.
2.2 Literature
Although the literature on self-control problems goes back to Strotz (1955) and Phelps
and Pollak (1968), and the models of present biased were formalized in the late nineties
with Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), present-bias is still an intensely
studied topic to this day.3
The papers in this literature that are conceptually most closely related to this paper are
these by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), and Laibson (2015). Both of these examine
commitment uptake and both papers use settings with stochastic costs.
The paper by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) examines the interaction between
present-biased agents and profit-maximizing firms. The paper is not explicitly modeling
commitment uptake, but derives the optimal contracts for firms selling either investment
or leisure goods to present-biased consumers. The type of tasks my paper is describing is
exactly investment goods, meaning goods or tasks where there is an immediate cost and
a delayed benefit. Therefore, the self-control problem and payoff structure is the same,
abstracting from the potential commitment. In their paper, firms price an investment
good below marginal costs such that preferences of time-inconsistent agents are aligned
with those of a time-consistent agent, but for high costs realizations the agent can choose
not to buy and will not incur any punishment. This implies that the contracts firms
offer to sophisticated consumers will make them fully overcome their present-bias, while
partially naive consumers will be exploited. In my paper, being perfectly sophisticated is
3 For an overview see Bryan et al. (2010).
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not enough to overcome one’s present-bias since commitment in my model has a wasteful
component — the fine the agent has to pay when not completing the task.
Laibson (2015) also seeks to explain why little commitment uptake is observed and he also
shows that commitment should be rare in many real-world settings. There are, however,
important differences in the settings. He is looking at a task that has to be completed,
and where the choice is when to complete it. He assumes a flow loss from not completing
task in any given period along with stochastic costs of completing the task (exactly as
in my model and as in DellaVigna and Malmendier’s paper), and this is what drives the
intra-personal conflict in his setting.
Laibson (2015) defines commitment as limiting of choice sets (In this particular case,
by setting binding deadlines). Though this is often how commitment is implemented
in experiments, I would argue that outside of the lab, this is a rarely observed type of
commitment. He finds that agents either allow themselves full flexibility to pick the
time to complete the task, or impose a binding deadline in the very first period. In
essence, this is a choice between no commitment and full commitment. In my setting,
partial commitment is an option. It is not straight-forward to compare results across the
two frameworks, but in Laibson’s (2015) paper, he finds that increasing the variance of
costs decreases demand for commitment. I find that the demand for partial commitment
increases with the variance in costs while having no effect on demand for full commitment.
In both of these papers, among others (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006, O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2001), partial naïveté is modeled as either a point belief about the degree of present-bias,
or as a simple probability an agent attaches to being time-consistent. My model allows
for a very flexible definition of partial naïveté where agents have a distribution of beliefs
about their present bias rather than an overconfident point-belief about their type. I
find that underconfidence rather than overconfidence is certain to decrease demand for
commitment.
In section 2.5 I use a simple finite horizon adaptation of the model by Ali (2011) to give
an example of the tradeoff between commitment and learning. This is also the tradeoff
of interest in his paper, but there are some important differences: as in the paper by
26
THE LIMITED POTENTIAL OF PARTIAL-COMMITMENT
Laibson (2015), Ali is mainly interested in restricting choice sets4. He does also allow
for so-called “nudges” that are similar to the commitment devices I propose, with the
important distinction that these commitment devices have no payoff consequences for
the “planner”. I will argue that the value of learning, or of experimenting, is lower in
my setting, and, unlike in his paper, non-informative under-commitment can happen
persistently (though this follows from a difference in assumptions). My setting therefore
also allows for persistent overconfidence.
Generally, the topic of persistency of biased beliefs have received increasing attention.
Christensen and Murooka (2018) explicitly looks at non-learning about present-bias in
an imperfect-recall model without commitment devices. In this paper, non-learning can
be sustained if agents are sufficiently optimistic about their future behavior and therefore
perceive it of little importance to acquire information today. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000)
show how strategic ignorance may be used as a self-discipline device, and ignorance or
biased beliefs function as a commitment device to restrict consumption of vice goods.
Bénabou and Tirole (2002) analyze the benefits of self-serving beliefs and characterize
when overconfidence can persist, while Bénabou and Tirole (2004) use self-signaling about
own willpower as a commitment device, which can lead to persistent under-confidence. I
allow for biased beliefs about self-control in either direction, and can ensure persistency
in either direction.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: In Section 2.3 I introduce the
baseline model, in Section 2.4 I analyze the consequences of partial naïveté, in Section 2.5
I consider commitment uptake in a dynamic setting, in Section 2.6 I discuss implications
and possible further directions, and in Section 2.7 I conclude.
2.3 Model
Consider a risk-neutral agent contemplating whether to go for a run. Running will have
immediate costs c ∈ [c, c] where c is distributed according to cdf F (c), and delayed health
benefits b. The agent is present-biased, such that the agent discounts future payoffs by
4 Building on the modeling of temptation from Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
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βδt. I assume that δ = 1, and β ∈ [0, 1]. Further, I assume that βb− c < 05 and b ∈ [c, c].
Together, these assumptions ensure that the agent will never go running, even for the
lowest possible costs, absent a commitment device, even though running is worthwhile
for some realizations of c, but not for all. Imagine, for instance, that the agent thinks it
is important to exercise regularly, and would consider running a worthwhile way of doing
so, but if there is a snowstorm the potential health benefits are not worth the cost of the
run. I will throughout the paper mainly focus on the case where b < E[c]. This implies
that the agent would prefer no commitment over full commitment.
In the following I characterize the agent’s preferred commitment device for the case where
costs are contactable. This will serve as a benchmark for the case where costs are not
contactable.
2.3.1 Benchmark
Agents would like to go running whenever b−c ≥ 0, therefore, an agent would like to sign
a commitment contract where there is no consequence of not running whenever c > b,
but where there is a punishment if the agent does not run whenever b > c. If agents know
their present bias, that is, if agents have correct beliefs about their β, agents would want
any contract where the agent would have to pay fee k(c) ≥ (1− β)b whenever c ≤ b and
fee k(c) = 0 whenever c > b.
Lemma 2.1. The optimal contract for a perfectly sophisticated agent is any contract where:
1. k(c) ≥ c− βb ∀c ≤ b.
2. k(c) = 0 ∀c > b.
There are three things to note from this. First, an agent never actually pays anything
but only incur the cost c, whenever c < b. Therefore, agents behave as if they were
time-consistent agents and the optimal commitment contract offers perfect commitment.
Second, this implies that the degree of present bias has no utility implications, and
5 This assumption can be relaxed and is only crucial in a repeated setting.
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therefore that demanding commitment is independent of an agent’s present bias6. Last,
increasing the variance of costs, does not necessarily make the agent worse off. Under
the assumption that b < E[c], a mean preserving spread of F (c) implies that the task
is worthwhile with a higher probability, and that the expected gain, b − E[c|c ≤ b], is
higher.
If β is not known, but the agent has beliefs about the distribution, Gˆ(·), of β, where the
domain of β is bounded and the lower bound β ≥ 0, then the agent is indifferent between
any contract with a fee of k(c) ≥ (1− β)b whenever c ≤ b and a fee of k(c) = 0 whenever
c > b.
Lemma 2.2. Given any beliefs Gˆ(β) about the distribution of β, the any commitment
contract with the following fee structure k(c) will implement the first best:
1. k(c) ≥ c− βb ∀c ≤ b.
2. k(c) = 0 ∀c > b.
Condition 1 and 2 are as derived above, and ensure that the commitment contract per-
fectly aligns the agent’s long-run and short-run preferences. If an agent accepts such
a contract (and is correct in believing that β is not smaller than β) then the agent
never actually incurs the fee k, and completes the task exactly when the patient long-
run self would wish to have the task completed. The valuation of such a contract is
Pr(c ≤ b)(b − E[c|c ≤ b]) = F (b)(b − E[c|c ≤ b]) assuming the agent would never com-
plete the task absent a commitment device. Since the value of the task is independent of
β, and under the assumption that the task would never be completed if the agent did not
choose some level of commitment, the value of commitment is not directly dependent on
β. But since the cutoff for k(c) depends on β, the degree of time-inconsistency and the
uncertainty of beliefs over β matter.
Constructing a contract of the described form relies on c being observable and verifiable.
Even if that is the case for most realizations of c or most states of the world (some
6Given that β < 1.
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probability of not being observable is sufficient for these contracts to break down). The
extreme situation is one where c is completely unobservable to a contractor.
Returning to the example of going for a run: Assume the agent considers it optimal to
go running every Tuesday, unless there is a blizzard or the agent has a headache. A
blizzard would be possible to contract on, and since weather conditions are easy to verify,
it should be feasible to make the contract conditional on the weather. Headaches, on
the other hand, are trickier to contract on. Therefore, I consider the case where c is not
contractable to characterize the agent’s optimal commitment contract (if one exists) in
this setting.
2.3.2 Second Best Contract
If the contract cannot be contingent on c, the only feasible commitment contracts involve
a fixed k > 0 if the agent does not complete the task. In the case of the running example,
k could be an actual monetary amount to be paid to a third party on Stickk, it could be
a fee for not showing up, if the commitment device is to run with a running club, or it
could be a psychological cost, or reputation cost, if the agent told friends or colleagues
that they would go running, and then failed to. I abstract from any costs of setting up
commitment. That means, it does not cost the agent anything to make a contract on
Stickk, to join a running club, or to tell friends about their plans to go running.
In the analysis when c is not contactable, the actual value of β becomes crucial along
with the beliefs about β. In the following I start out by identifying the optimal contract
for a fully sophisticated agent. Thereafter I examine the implications of introducing
uncertainty over β either as biased or unbiased beliefs.
Perfectly sophisticated agents with non-contractable costs
In this section I characterize the optimal commitment contracts for a fully sophisticated
agent when contracts cannot be contingent on c, where c is distributed according to cdf
F (c) with pdf f(c). If an agent chooses a fee k, the agent has the payoff βb − c when
completing the task, and −k if not completing the task. Hence, the agent completes
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the task whenever βb − c > −k. The agent does not know the cost realization c when
choosing a k, but only the distribution of costs. The agent can freely choose any fee,
k, for a commitment device and because the costs are bounded it is always possible to
construct a commitment device (i.e. choose a k) such that the present-biased agent always
completes the task i.e. full commitment is available.
I am interested in the case where the agent prefers no commitment to full commitment,
that is 0 > b − E[c]. Otherwise, if 0 < b − E[c] some level of (potentially full) commit-
ment is always optimal. Therefore, under the assumption that 0 > b − E[c] if an agent
demands commitment it is always an intermediate level of commitment. The payoff from
a commitment device with fee k is given by:
U(k) = F (βb+ k)(b− E [c|c ≤ βb+ k])− k(1− F (βb+ k)).
The following proposition gives necessary and sufficient conditions for a positive commit-
ment level k being optimal for some degree β of present-bias:
Proposition 2.1. Assuming c is continuously distributed according to cdf F (c) where
E[c] > b. Then, if ∃ c ∈ (c, c) s.t.:
b >
1− F (c′)
f(c′) > −
f(c′)
f ′(c′) > 0, (2.1)
then ∃ β′ s.t. intermediate commitment k = c′ − β′b is optimal. For a given β′, non-zero
commitment is optimal if ∃k′ > 0 s.t.:
b(1− β) = 1− F (β
′b+ k′)
f(β′b+ k′) > −
f(β′b+ k′)
f ′(β′b+ k′) > 0. (2.2)
For details, see Appendix B.0.1. The conditions on the distribution of c require that the
Mill’s ratio of F (c) is (locally) increasing, and that the pdf is (locally) decreasing. This
is not the case for several important classes of distribution functions including Normal
distributions and uniform distributions, though it is the case for Pareto distributions and
inverse logistic distributions.
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Therefore, whenever E[c] > b, a non-zero level of commitment is rarely optimal. However,
if E[c] < b, by the same argument, full commitment is likely optimal, even though there
are realizations of c where even a time-consistent agent does not want to complete the
task.
Intuitively, when increasing the fee, k, the agent is facing a tradeoff between decreasing the
likelihood of having to pay k, but paying a higher k, along with increasing the probability
of completing the task but decreasing the expected gain of a completed task. Whether
these tradeoffs lead to the agent choosing commitment that leads to over- or under-
completion of the task relative to a time-consistent agent depends on the distribution of
costs. It is possible that the agent prefers a commitment device k such that the time-
inconsistent agent completes the task exactly when a time-consistent agent also completes
the task. This is the case only if k = b(1− β), or:
b(1− β) = 1− F (b)
f(b) > −
f(b)
f ′(b) > 0.
Since the right-hand side does not depend on β, for each possible cost distribution f(c)
where an interior optimum exists, there is full alignment of long-run and short-run pref-
erences for at most one unique β. Therefore, perfect commitment is not a general result,
but rather the exception. If 0 < − f(b)
f ′(b) <
1−F (b)
f(b) ≤ b, then there exist a β for which
perfect commitment is optimal.
Corollary 2.1. If agents face stochastic costs that cannot be contracted upon, then:
1. The optimal commitment contract does not ensure that sophisticates behave as time-
consistent agents.
2. Perfectly sophisticated consumers may optimally choose no commitment.
3. Observing an agent behaving differently from a time-consistent agent is not proof
that the agent is naive.
Whether a sophisticated time-inconsistent agent is more or less likely to complete the task
than a time-consistent agent depends on the parameters of the model. The important
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finding, however, is that it is not proof of an agent being naive, that an agent does not
complete the task for a cost realization c for which a time-consistent agent would. It
could be naïveté, but it could also be that perfect commitment is not optimal. This
finding is in contrast to the benchmark case where perfect commitment is always optimal
and also in contrast to the findings by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) where agents
only demand non-perfect commitment if they are naive.
So far, I have considered continuous distributions of c where non-zero commitment is
only optimal for a limited set of distribution functions and parameter values. In order
to build intuition, I, now, consider simple discrete cost distributions to examine under
which conditions non-zero commitment is optimal.
For c distributed according to the discrete cdf F (c), with pdf f(c), existence of non-zero
partial commitment is ensured by the following proposition:
Lemma 2.3. If c is distributed according to the discrete pdf f(c), a perfectly sophisticated
agent demands non-zero commitment if:
max
ci
U(k = ci − βb) = max
ci
βb− ci +
ci∑
c=c
f(c) (b(1− β) + ci − c) > 0, (2.3)
where ci ∈ supp(f) = {c = c1, c2, . . . , c = cn}, and c1 < c2 < . . . < cn.
Details can be found in Appendix B.0.2, but the intuition is the following: the agent
prefers paying the lowest possible fee which ensures a certain action. Thus, any k an
agent considers satisfies k = ci − βb for some ci ∈ supp(f). If no such k gives the agent
a positive payoff in expectation, the agent prefers no commitment.
2.3.3 Example with two cost levels
In this section, using the result from Lemma 2.3, I provide a simple example for existence
of optimal partial commitment for sophisticated agents. Furthermore, through a com-
parative statics I address the implications of changes to the underlying cost distribution.
If there are only two possible costs c ∈ {c, c}, where c < b < c, with probability p of
c occurring, partial commitment implies that the time-inconsistent agent completes the
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task if c = c but not if c = c.
Coming back to the running example, this is the case if agents would run whenever they do
not have a headache, but stay at home otherwise. Therefore, the preferred intermediate
commitment device makes an agent indifferent between running and not running when
the agent does not have a headache. The cost could, for instance, be an amount of money
to pay, or a number of people that the agent will have a reputation loss from.
Proposition 2.2. If no commitment is preferred over full commitment, a perfectly sophis-
ticated agent prefers intermediate commitment if:
β ≥ c− b · p
b− b · p.
If full commitment is preferred over no commitment, a perfectly sophisticated agent prefers
intermediate commitment if:
β ≥ 1− c− c
b
.
If the agent chooses such a commitment device, the present biased agent’s preferences will
be aligned with those of a time-consistent agent. That is, any intermediate commitment
devices in this setting ensures perfect commitment. This result is driven by the two-cost
distribution, rather than being a general result.
In both cases, the right-hand side is strictly less than c/b(> β), which means that for this
particular simple example, there is always a cutoff for β, such that every agent with a less
severe present bias than the cutoff will choose intermediate commitment. See Appendix
B.0.3 for details.
It is even possible that the condition will be satisfied for all positive β, meaning that
even the most severe degree of present bias (β = 0) can be overcome such that all
perfectly sophisticated agents behave as time-consistent agents. In the running example,
this implies that anyone can find a commitment device that would make them run with
certainty if they do not have a headache, but never otherwise.
The main points provided by this example are summarized in the following:
34
THE LIMITED POTENTIAL OF PARTIAL-COMMITMENT
Corollary 2.2. In a setting with two possible cost levels:
1. Demand for perfect commitment is decreasing in present-bias.
2. If no commitment is preferred over full commitment only the least present biased
agents will demand commitment.
3. If full commitment is preferred over no commitment, every agent demands commit-
ment but only the least present-biased behave as time-consistent agents.
4. An increase in the spread of costs increases the demand for perfect commitment.
To understand the intuition, consider the running example: Preferring full commitment
over no commitment occurs when the high cost, having a headache, is rare. In this case,
all agents agree that running in the unlikely event of having a headache is preferred over
never running. But for partial commitment, the different types disagree: if the agent is
severely present-biased the fee, k, necessary to make the agent run is high, even when
the agent does not have a headache. Therefore, the cost the agent will incur from not
running with a headache outweighs the cost from running with a headache. Therefore, the
severely present-biased will demand stronger commitment than the less present-biased.
If no commitment is preferred over full commitment, the least present-biased agents still
demand perfect commitment but in this case, the most present-biased agents choose no
commitment. The argument is similar. Intermediate commitment becomes too expensive
for the severely present-biased because the fee necessary to ensure any running will be
so high that paying it whenever the agent has a headache outweighs the benefit from
running when healthy.
Overall, demand for commitment is ambiguously related to the agent’s degree of present
bias. It is monotonically related to present bias given a specific cost function, but not
across cost functions. Additionally, the closer to time-consistent an agent is, the likelier it
is that the agent can fully overcome the self-control issue and behave like a time-consistent
agent.
Further, increasing the spread of c, keeping E[c] fixed, increases the likelihood that the
agent prefers the intermediate level of commitment over any of the extremes. Implying
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that a higher variance of costs benefits the agents unambiguously, at least weakly. The
intuition is as follows: In this simple case, increasing the spread means decreasing c. A
lower c increases the net gain from completing the task when the agent is healthy, b− c,
holding fixed β. Therefore, a lower fee is needed to ensure the agent goes running when
healthy, which means that the fee to be paid when the agent has a headache is lower.
An example with only two cost levels has its limitations. Especially since perfect com-
mitment is the only partial commitment available. Three cost levels allows for character-
ization of the existence of over- and under-commitment. I have also examined this case
and the main findings are the following:
Proposition 2.3. In a setting with three possible cost levels:
1. A sophisticated agent may optimally commit to completing the task more or less
often than a time-consistent agent.
2. A larger self-control problem ambiguously affects the demand for commitment.
3. Increasing the spread of costs increases the likelihood of a sophisticated agent de-
manding perfect commitment and demanding partial commitment overall.
Details can be found in Appendix B.0.4.
So far, the agents have been perfectly sophisticated, which is a strong assumption. In
the following, I examine the implications of relaxing this assumption.
2.4 Partial naïveté
In this section I examine the importance of the most prominent assumption in the present-
bias literature: naïveté. Often naïveté is modeled as a point belief, βˆ, about β where
βˆ > β. The advantage of this assumption is its simplicity while still explaining many
core findings. However, I allow for a more flexible definition of partial naïveté: agents
can have any distribution of beliefs, Gˆ(β), over β.
Partial naïveté in this context therefore does not necessarily imply over-confidence, but
allows for both under- and over-confidence in expectation. Thereby, this definition also
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allows for analysis of the implication of uncertainty itself. I use the term partial naïveté
to refer to any non-degenerate beliefs about β.7
The valuation of an intermediate commitment device k is:
U(k) = Pr(βb− c ≥ −k)(b− E[c|βb− c ≥ −k])− k · Pr(βb− c ≥ −k),
where the only difference from the perfect sophistication case is that, in this case, the
agents have beliefs about how β and c are distributed.
Define z = c − βb and let Fz(x) and fz(x) be the cdf and pdf of z, then the agent’s
expected value of an intermediate commitment device k is:
U(k) = Fz(k)b−
∫ c
c
cf(c)
(
1− Gˆ
(
c− k
b
))
dc− k(1− Fz(k)).
Which leads to the following optimality condition:
(k + b)fz(k) =
1
b
∫ c
c
cf(c)gˆ
(
c− k
b
)
dc+ 1− Fz(k).
The left hand side is the marginal gain from increasing k, that is, the agent is more
likely to complete the task and therefore to receive b, while being less likely to incur
the fee k. On the right hand side are the costs of increasing k. The agent incurs the
marginally higher k whenever the agent does not complete the task, or with probability
1 − Fz(k). Additionally, the expected cost is now higher, conditional on the task being
completed. Overall, the agent’s problem is very similar to that of known β, only with
added uncertainty. To develop intuition for the implications of such uncertainty and the
tradeoffs the agent is facing, I go through a simple example.8
7 I therefore abstract from the case where agents are certain about their type, but have wrong beliefs.
8Details can be found in Appendix B.0.5.
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2.4.1 Example with unknown present-bias and three cost levels
Consider a setting where β is uniformly distributed, with β ∈
[
β, β
]
, c ∈ {c1, c2, c3} with
c1 < c2 < c3 and the probabilities of the three cost realizations are p1, p2, p3, respectively.
Assume that c1 < b < c2, b < E[c] and c2 − βb < c3 − β. These assumptions ensure that
a time-consistent agent only wants to complete the task for the lowest cost, c1, that the
task will never be completed without commitment, and that there exist a k such that the
task will be completed with certainty for c1 and c2, but never for c3.
The agent’s utility from choosing a commitment device with a fee, k, is given by:
U(k) =p1 ((b− c1)Pr(βb− c1 ≥ −k)− k · Pr(βb− c1 ≥ −k))
+p2 ((b− c2)Pr(βb− c2 ≥ −k)− k · Pr(βb− c2 ≥ −k))− k · p3.
If there exists a k > 0 such that this is strictly positive then the agent demands com-
mitment. If the agent’s preferred k ensures that the task will be completed for c1 and
never otherwise, then the optimal commitment is perfect. Because the agent has uniform
beliefs over β, any optimum is a corner solution9, but because of the discrete nature of the
cost distribution function, there are not just the two extremes of full or no commitment;
instead there are additional kinks.
The following proposition gives sufficient conditions for an agent demanding perfect com-
mitment:
Proposition 2.4. A partially naive agent will choose perfect commitment if the following
holds:
β ≥ max
{
1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
,
c1 − b · p1
b− b · p1
}
,
under the assumptions that βb− c1 < 0 and b(β − β) < min{c3 − c2, c2 − c1}.
The last assumption ensures that it is possible to find a commitment device such that
9 The joint distribution function of β and c is piecewise uniform. Therefore, the derivative of the joint
pdf is non-negative and violates the second order condition for utility maximization.
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the agent completes the task with certainty for c = c1 but never for c = c2, or with
certainty for c ∈ {c1, c2} but never for c = c2.10 Therefore, there are two interior kinks:
the smallest k that makes the agent complete the task with (perceived) certainty for c1
and otherwise not, and the smallest k that makes the agent complete the task for c1 and
c2 but not for c3. Under these assumptions, the agent can be certain of the action taken
given any realization of costs and the agent therefore has to choose whether to never
complete, complete only if c = c1, complete if c ∈ {c1, c2} or always complete the task.
In Appendix B.0.3 I analyze the case where the assumption does not hold.
Overall there are two minimum bounds for β, implying that under the simplifying as-
sumptions, an agent is less likely to take up a perfect commitment device the bigger a
present bias issue the agent believes to have with positive probability. In this example,
neither the spread, nor the upper bound of the support of the beliefs directly affect the
agent’s commitment uptake. This implies that uncertainty about own self control issues
itself is not a deterrent for commitment device uptake, and neither is overoptimism or
biased naïveté.
However, perfect commitment is not the only option. It is possible the agent prefers a k
such that the task will be completed even for c2. The following proposition provides suf-
ficient conditions for a partially naive agent choosing stronger than perfect commitment.
Proposition 2.5. A partially naive agent will choose a commitment device that is stronger
than perfect commitment if:
β ∈
(
c1
p3b
+ c2 − c1 − b
b
· p2 + p3
p3
, 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
)
,
under the assumptions that βb− c1 < 0 and b(β − β) < min{c3 − c2, c2 − c1}.
In this case, the agent prefers the stronger commitment device even though it means
completing the task when the cost is higher than the benefit. It is not clear how demand
for commitment behaves with an increase in spread of β or when more or less overconfident
agents would demand such commitment, but it is clear that there is a lower bound on b
10Details can be found in Appendix B.0.6.
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such that for β lower than this, an agent chooses no commitment. Therefore, increasing
the spread while keeping the mean of β constant does decrease the agent’s propensity to
acquire commitment.
Proposition 2.6. Under the assumption that an agent believes the task will not be com-
pleted without commitment, the example shows that:
1. There is no direct effect of the mean β on demand for commitment.
2. Demand for perfect commitment is increasing in the lower bound of beliefs on β.
3. There is no direct effect of uncertainty about β on demand for commitment.
4. A mean preserving increase weakly decreases demand for commitment.
However, increasing the uncertainty over β eventually leads to violation of the assumption
b(β−β) < c2−c1. The details for this case can be found in Appendix B.0.6. I will, in the
following, give brief summary of the main differences between this case and the former.
Lemma 2.4. Without perfect separability, the following holds:
1. Perfect commitment is no longer possible in expectation.
2. The agent faces a tradeoff between ensuring task completion for low costs but risk
completing for high costs, and prevent completing for high costs but but risk not
completing for low costs.
Overall, this example shows that being overconfident, either defined by E[β] or β does not
directly affect the demand for commitment. More important is the biggest self-control
problem an agent attaches a positive probability to having. Being under-confident, or
overestimating one’s own self-control problem ma,y however, be a bigger hindrance for
overcoming self-control problems than underestimating it. The intuition is again that
the fee needed is too high for intermediate commitment to be worthwhile, and agents
therefore gravitate towards either full or no commitment. In this example I imposed an
upper bound on the agent’s possible overconfidence. I assumed that βb − c1 < 0, which
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means that the task will not be completed even for the smallest present-bias that the
agent perceives possible. This is a strong assumption, and if I relax this assumption
there exist beliefs gˆ(β) such that the agent prefers no commitment. In the limit, if the
agent has degenerate beliefs such that the agent believes β = 1 with certainty, the agent
will not demand any commitment.
Furthermore, a marginal underestimation of present bias leads the task to be completed
too rarely, therefby incurring the fee too often, but also means that the fee is slightly
lower. Partial naïveté in the form of underconfidence may make an agent not take up
commitment at all, and since the optimal choice of commitment is sometimes solely
determined by the lower bound of β, a small positive probability attached to a very low β
might be detrimental, even if the agent is overconfident in expectation. This also means
that there is a non-monotonic demand for commitment as a function of β.
Even though this is a very simple example, where the simplicity of the results depend on
the assumption of uniform costs, this might still help explain why there appears to be
persistence of naïveté. Because the optimal action for an agent only indirectly depends
on the uncertainty about preferences, there is little incentive to form precise beliefs, and
since only pessimistic beliefs are unambiguously bad for the agent, while optimistic beliefs
might be completely innocuous, there is also little incentive to form unbiased beliefs.
To show the intuition for the limited incentive to learn, I give an example of a simple
dynamic decision problem where an agent may optimally stay naive.
2.5 Example of Learning about Self-Control
So far I have considered an agent’s choice of commitment in a static setting. But for
many important real world tasks, like running, the agent can complete them multiple
times. In a repeated setting where agents are not only considering whether to complete a
task once, agents potentially value experimentation if this can lead to more precise beliefs
about their present bias.
I go through a finite horizon adaptation of the setup from Ali (2011) but unlike in his
framework it is not possible to directly restrict choice sets. In his paper, Ali does allow
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for part of the commitment to come from costs that are triggered by a failure to complete
the task, but an important difference is that these costs are not directly payoff relevant
for the planner. That is, if the agent picks a commitment device that does not provide full
commitment, the agent does not take into account the expected cost from paying the fee
with positive probability. In this paper, the core assumption is that the agent has to pay
this fee if the task is not completed. I also allow for perfect recall, so that the agent can
look back and see exactly which cost realizations along with which commitment devices
have been successful in the past. Despite this, I find that agents may not learn. As in
the one-shot case, the agent’s preference over full commitment versus no commitment is
independent of the agent’s beliefs about their own present bias. Only the expected value
of partial commitment depends on the agent’s beliefs.
It follows directly from the analysis in Ali’s (2011) paper that once the agent chooses a
non-informative option, here no commitment or full commitment, the agent sticks to this
option indefinitely. This implies that if no commitment is preferred over full commitment,
the agent will either keep experimenting until the agent is perfectly informed about their
type, or switch in finite time to no commitment and stay there indefinitely with no further
updating of beliefs. Given my assumption that no commitment is uninformative, this also
means that, unlike in Ali’s paper, no commitment combined with limited learning can
be a long-run outcome, although, in line with Ali’s paper, this happens when the agent
reaches a sufficiently pessimistic posterior.
2.5.1 Finite period example
In order to get an intuition for the dynamics at play. Consider a two period setting,
T = 2, with two costs, c ∈ {c, c}, two possible degrees of present bias, β ∈ {β, β}, and
with δ = 1.
Going back to the running example. Imagine the cost are that either the agent has
a headache, or the agent is in good health. The agent believes that they will not go
running without some commitment, but are unsure about how much commitment would
be needed. With probability g the agent believes they have a present bias parameter of
β, and with 1 − g, β > β. The agent knows that the chance of not having a headache
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is p, and therefore there is a risk of 1 − p of having a headache. If the agent were to
take up perfect commitment, it would either be k = c − βb or k = c − βb. I assume
that βb− c < βb− c, such that the agent can ensure they will run when healthy without
risking that the commitment is so strong that they will also run with a headache with
strictly positive probability.
As in the previous sections, I assume that b < E(c) = pc+(1−pc) so that the agent would
prefer never running over having to run every time they have a headache. If the agents
were completely myopic, they would pick either no commitment, or the intermediate
commitment device that maximizes their expected payoff in the current period. If no
commitment is preferred over either of the two intermediate commitment levels then the
myopic agent would choose the non-informative action of k = 0, or no commitment, in
both periods.
But even though agents might not want any intermediate commitment in the short-run
given their prior beliefs, they might want to experiment to achieve a better expected
outcome over both periods. In this simple example, the only way to experiment is to pick
a commitment device such that there will be different actions taken for the two possible
levels of β, at least given some cost realization. A partially naive agent chooses costly
experimentation in the first period if the following holds:
Proposition 2.7. A partially naive agent chooses experimentation in a two-shot game if:
β <
c− b · p
b− b · p,
and:
β ∈
{
c− b(1− g)p− (b− c)p(1− g)
b− b(1− g)p ,
c− b(1− g)p
b− b(1− g)p
}
.
If the agent picks the higher level of commitment, k, the agent always goes running if
healthy, and never with a headache, therefore, this option does not provide any informa-
tion about the agent’s present bias. The lower level of commitment, k, does potentially
provide information. If c = c the agent never goes running, so here no additional infor-
mation is provided, but if c = c the agent only goes running if the present-bias is small,
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β, and not with a bigger present-bias, β. Therefore, if the agent prefers experimentation,
the agent will pick k.11
However, if k is also the optimal choice in a one-shot game, learning is a side-effect of the
short-term optimal decision, and not a sign that the agent values experimentation. The
upper bounds on β ensures that the agent would not choose commitment in a one-shot
game, but would choose intermediate commitment if β = β.
This means that if the agent only considered going running once, the perceived probability
of having the less severe present bias, β, is too low for intermediate commitment to be
optimal, but if the agent knew β = β intermediate commitment is optimal. Therefore,
the information has potential value to the agent.
If the agent does not experiment, the best option is choosing no commitment and having
zero payoffs in both periods. The only option for experimentation is choosing β at t = 1
and then choosing either no commitment or intermediate commitment at t = 2, depending
on the outcome from the first period. If the agent did go running at t = 1, the agent
knows for sure that β = β. Not completing the task if c = c implies the agent has
β = β with certainty, while not completing the task for c = c provides no information.
Experimenting leads the agent to incur an expected negative payoff in the first period,
but with positive probability to incur a strictly positive payoff in the second period.
From this simple example are the following take-aways:
Corollary 2.3. If no commitment is preferred over full commitment:
• A partially naive agent may stay naive.
• Propensity to experiment is decreasing in expected present-bias.
• Propensity to experiment is increasing in spread of present-bias.
It is in itself not a surprising result that the agent will experiment under some conditions
if the task is repeated.
11 For details, see Appendix B.0.8
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What is interesting is that choosing no commitment is likely the more present biased the
agent believes to be, and that no commitment can lead to no learning. If the low level of
intermediate commitment k is optimal even in a one-shot, the agent continues to choose
this level of commitment indefinitely if β = β, and the agent becomes fully aware of their
true present bias as soon as c = c is realized. If β = β, then the agent also becomes fully
aware as soon as c = c, and then switches to no commitment.
Overall, this potential learning channel can explain why agents choose commitment de-
vices that “fail”, since this is the only way to update about beliefs. Additionally, if it is
not optimal to experiment, then agents never learn but either never go running or always
go running.
2.6 Discussion
I have only briefly looked at the potential for learning about self-control issues but it would
be interesting to see how this explanation of a limited potential value from learning could
help reconcile some of the other findings in the literature. Having non-learning that does
not rely on ego concerns, positive value of self-confidence, biased beliefs, or strategic
concerns, is appealing and, if plausible, can explain why these other concerns may be
allowed to dominate in other contexts. If having precise and unbiased beliefs has little
value in many contexts, then the benefits to having distorted beliefs in other contexts
ends up dominating overall.
In my model, agents are facing an intra-personal contracting problem. There is no third
party, and therefore no possibility of side transfers. Therefore, the agent cannot be
compensated for the fine by a lump sum transfer or similar. This setting is plausible for
most small-stake but common tasks where agents might be more likely to demand softer
commitments, involving image concerns and psychological costs as potential fines, like
telling friends that they plan to run, rather than signing formal contracts.
Though Stickk.com is a third party contractor, this is very similar to their setting: on
Stickk, a user defines a task and the criteria for its completion, then picks a punishment
which can be a monetary amount donated to a charity that the agent would normally
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not wish to support (e.g. a political party the user does not agree with) or only chooses
softer punishment like having friends or a third party referee monitoring progress. In
the latter case, only image concerns are at stake and a user is not compensated for
the potential punishment. A potential user is facing exactly this tradeoff in my model:
choosing punishment that ensures the task will be completed but potentially completing
it for high cost realizations, or setting a lower punishment but expecting to fail with
positive probability and thereby incurring the costs. There are no side transfers; the
website is not offering users a lump sum to sign a contract and then asking them to pay
the fine to the website in case of failure.
If the setting described in this paper is empirically prevalent, and this explains limited
commitment uptake, it poses complications for quantifying empirical naïveté. It is not
enough to observe that agents do not take up commitment to show they are naive, and
more importantly, that agents perform better or complete a task more often under exter-
nally imposed commitment rather than self-imposed commitment is not proof that agents
are partially naive: they might be perfectly sophisticated and choose no commitment or
little commitment because commitment is inefficient for high cost realizations.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper I use an adaptation of the standard present-bias model (Laibson, 1997 and
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999) with stochastic costs to give new insights into the (lack of)
demand for commitment.Overall, I find that if commitment is socially wasteful, agents
are unlikely to be better off with commitment than without. This result relies on the
assumption of variance in costs, although stochastic costs are not themselves detrimental.
On the contrary - if a task is not worthwhile in expectation, variance in costs may make
it possible to have positive utility from completing a task. This means that variance in
costs increases agents welfare, at least weakly.
I find that commitment is not necessarily implied by sophistication, and that perfect
commitment (commitment that commits an agent to behave exactly as a time-consistent
agent) is an exception rather than a general result. Therefore, observing agents not
behaving as time-consistent agents does not imply that they are naive. In a one-shot
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setting, it might be optimal to choose a commitment device where one will incur a fee
with positive probability for not completing. Additionally, I find that overconfidence
is not necessarily bad, but underconfidence always is, which could help explain why,
empirically, overconfidence is prevalent. Lastly, since commitment is not attractive to
all agents (even if they were perfectly sophisticated), the value of learning about own
self-control problems is small, and opportunities to learn may be scarce if agents do not
learn about their type without commitment.
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Chapter 3
Procrastination and Learning about Self-Control∗
3.1 Introduction
Many people procrastinate filing tax returns, setting up a financial portfolio, finding a
better credit card contract, or doing a referee report.1 In some situations, people keep
procrastinating the same or similar tasks again and again. Such “naïveté” about own
future self-control appears prevalent in many economic environments, and theoretical and
empirical literature has investigated its implications. Most of the theoretical literature,
however, assumes (either explicitly or implicitly) that people do not learn about their
naïveté over time. This opens up a natural question: why do people not learn about
their naïveté?
Building upon the literature on naïveté about self-control developed by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999; 2001), we investigate whether and when a time-inconsistent agent
does not learn about her self-control problem over time. In our basic model, a time-
inconsistent agent is initially not sure whether her future selves will be time-consistent
or time-inconsistent. Note that she initially underestimates the probability that she is
actually time-inconsistent. At the beginning of each period, however, she actively chooses
whether or not to learn about her own self-control problem by incurring a non-negative
∗ This chapter is based on joint work with Takeshi Murooka.
1 Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and DellaVigna (2009), we say that an agent “procras-
tinates” if she plans to do a task in some period with some probability but actually does so with
lower probability. For evidence of procrastination, see, for example, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002),
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), and Skiba and Tobacman (2008).
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cost of learning. We highlight the case in which the agent can perfectly learn about her
self-control problem and the cost of learning is zero. Crucially, we assume that learning
about own self-control takes time (i.e., an agent has to spend some period of time to
update her beliefs) and that the agent cannot commit to future actions.
Our key mechanism is that the agent may procrastinate learning about her own self-
control. The intuition is two-fold. First, because learning changes own future actions,
a time-inconsistent agent may indirectly incur a cost from learning if changing a future
action involves both future benefits (e.g., returns from setting up a financial portfolio)
and future costs (e.g., effort cost to set up a financial portfolio). We show that this
indirect cost occurs only when an agent has intra-personal conflicts between future selves
(e.g., hyperbolic discounting), but not when she has intra-personal conflicts only between
her current self and future selves (e.g., quasi-hyperbolic discounting). Second, because
the time-inconsistent agent initially underestimates the possibility that she will be time-
inconsistent, she underestimates the probability that she will procrastinate in the future,
and hence she may prefer to delay the learning opportunity. Note that the logic here
is akin to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001). As a result, the agent may avoid the
opportunity to learn about her own self-control problem, even when the (direct) cost
of learning is zero. We also derive conditions in which procrastination of learning and
non-completion of a task is a unique equilibrium outcome. Our result helps explain why
people procrastinate even when they face similar tasks repeatedly.
This non-learning result has the following implications. First, if people have time-
inconsistent preferences and cannot commit to future actions they may not learn about
their naïveté even when the cost of learning is zero. This result complements the study
by Ali (2011) which shows that time-inconsistent people will perfectly learn about their
self-control if they can take up a flexible commitment device. Indeed, our results bridge
the gap between his theoretical result and the empirical prevalence of naïveté. Second,
even when people are inherently aware of their own self-control problem, whenever facing
a new task they may prefer to forget or neglect their awareness and take an action as
an ignorant self. Perhaps surprisingly, this incentive to forget or neglect own self-control
problems does not depend on self-esteem (e.g., anticipatory utility, ego utility, private
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image, or social image) which is often assumed in the literature (e.g., Kőszegi, 2006,
Gottlieb, 2014, 2016).
As an important extension, when an agent has multiple initially-uncertain attributes (e.g.,
she is uncertain about both her own future self-control and own ability for the task), we
derive conditions in which the agent’s endogenous learning decisions may be misdirected—
she chooses to learn what she should not learn from the long-run perspective, and she
chooses not to learn what she should learn from the long-run perspective.
Related Literature. There are several strands of literature that investigate why people
do not learn over time. Most closely related to our paper is the literature on strategic ig-
norance: Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Bénabou and Tirole (2002) show how an agent
may strategically abstain from a learning opportunity to keep motivating their own future
selves to work harder under the presence of self-control problems. Relatedly, Bénabou
and Tirole (2004) study how an agent may commit to some personal rule to maintain
self-reputation. Although our result on non-learning might look similar, the mechanisms
are quite different: an agent in these papers chooses not to learn as a means of internal
commitment (and to improve own future payoffs), whereas an agent in our paper does
so because she underestimates the probability that she will behave time consistently. In-
deed, non-learning in our model is harmful from the agent’s long-run perspective because
it leads to a non-completion of a task.
Among the literature on self-esteem, Kőszegi (2006) and Gottlieb (2014; 2016) investigate
models in which an agent may avoid learning because of the presence of ego utility, private
image, or anticipatory utility. In our model, such psychological costs are captured as a
direct cost of learning. In contrast to the literature, we show that non-learning can occur
even when there is no direct (physical or psychological) cost of learning.
The literature on non-Bayesian updating, such as Benjamin et al. (2016), focuses on
cases in which an agent does not update her own beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. The
literature on selective attention, such as Schwartzstein (2014) and Gagnon-Bartsch et al.
(2017), analyzes situations in which an agent systematically does not encode a certain
type of signal. In contrast to this literature, we focus on the situation in which an agent
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can perfectly learn about own naïveté and the cost of learning itself can be zero, but the
agent actively chooses not to learn about own naïveté.
Finally, our result on multiple initially-uncertain attributes is related to the recent lit-
erature on learning under misspecified models Fudenberg et al. (2017); Heidhues et al.
(2018); Hestermann and Le Yaouanq (2017). Building upon and extending this literature,
our mechanism based on procrastination explains why an agent’s learning decisions can
be misdirected even when she can choose to perfectly learn about all uncertain attributes.
Structure. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our
model and discusses its key assumptions. Section 3.3 analyzes an illustrative model of
task completion. Section 3.4 investigates the model with task choice and task completion.
Section 3.5 examines extensions where an agent initially has multiple uncertain attributes
and can choose to learn about either (or both) of them. Section 3.6 briefly discusses other
extensions. Section 3.7 concludes. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
3.2 Model
This section introduces our basic model. Section 3.2.1 sets up the model. Section 3.2.2
discusses our key assumptions.
3.2.1 Setup
A risk-neutral agent can initiate a task in periods t = 1, 2, · · · , T , where T ≥ 2 is either
finite or infinite. Once she initiates a task, from the next period on she can complete the
task. Each task is represented by x = (c, b): completing the task in period t gives a cost
c ≥ 0 in period t and brings a benefit b ≥ 0 in period t + 1. There is no (physical or
psychological) cost of initiating a task. The agent can initiate (and complete) at most
one task throughout the game.
Let ut denote the agent’s period-t instantaneous utility. There are two types of agents:
time-consistent and time-inconsistent ones. The type of each agent is persistent through-
out the game. For the time-consistent agent, her total utility in period t is ut+
∑∞
τ=t+1 δ
τ−tuτ
with δ ∈ (0, 1). For the time-inconsistent agent, her total utility in period t is ut +
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∑∞
τ=t+1D(τ − t)uτ , where D(τ − t) represents her time discounting in τ − t periods.2
We assume that D(t) is decreasing and that there exists B(t) ∈ (0, 1] for t ≥ 1 such
that D(t) = δtB(t). Intuitively, B(t) represents the time-inconsistent part of the agent’s
preferences. For example, the standard exponential-discounting function is represented
by B(t) = 1 for t ≥ 1, present-biased preferences (i.e., quasi-hyperbolic discounting)
are represented by B(t) = β with β ∈ (0, 1) for t ≥ 1, and a “modified” hyperbolic
discounting function is represented by B(t) = 11+rt where r > 0.
3
Both types of agents are initially uncertain about their own future self-control. We assume
that all agents share the same initial belief and that their initial belief about their own
future time consistency, denoted by Bˆ(t), is Bˆ(t) = B(t) with probability 1 − q ∈ (0, 1]
and Bˆ(t) = 1 with probability q. In line with the literature on limited cognition and
beliefs as assets (Bénabou, 2015; Bénabou and Tirole, 2016), we assume that updating
her initial belief about her own self-control requires the agent to actively choose to learn
(we substantially discuss this assumption in Section 3.2.2). Formally, in each period the
agent can acquire a signal about her own self-control by incurring a cost m ≥ 0, while
sticking to her initial beliefs if she has not acquired the signal. To focus on our main
mechanism, we assume that learning is perfect and perpetual: the signal is perfectly
informative and the agents become completely sophisticated about their own self-control
problems for the rest of the game.
The timing of the game is as follows. If the agent has not previously taken any action,
in each period she takes one of the following actions: learning about her own self-control
problem, choosing a task, or not doing anything. If the agent has initiated a task, in
each period the agent takes one of the following actions: learning about own self-control
problem, completing the task, or not doing anything. We assume that if the agent is
indifferent between taking some action and not doing anything, then she will take the
2 See, for example, Echenique et al. (2017) for the analysis under general time preferences. Relatedly,
Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2017) analyzes Rubinstein’s alternative bargaining problem with general
time preferences.
3Note that a typical hyperbolic discounting function is defined as D(t) = 11+rt where r > 0, instead
of D(t) = δt1+rt .
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action.4
As an equilibrium concept, we extend the perception-perfect equilibria (O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 2001) in that (i) in each continuation game an agent chooses her best response
given her belief and that (ii) an agent keeps using the initial prior about her own self-
control problem if she has not acquired a signal about own self-control.
3.2.2 Discussion of Key Assumptions
Learning is active. A crucial assumption of our model is that the agent has to actively
choose to learn: whenever updating her beliefs, she has to “encode” a signal (e.g., she
needs to introspect from own past experience).5 Hence, our model is different from a
classical one in which Bayesian updating happens automatically. It is also different from
self-confirming equilibria, as the agent in our model updates her beliefs only when she
chooses to do so.6
Unless the agent chooses to learn, she does not revise her beliefs and keeps using her
prior belief. Hence, different from Bénabou and Tirole (2004), we rule out self-signaling
over time. In line with O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999; 2001), we also assume away the
possibility that the agent becomes aware of her own self-control by inferring from own
current preferences (i.e., we assume away inferences like “because my preferences are
time-inconsistent today, I must be a time-inconsistent type in the future”).7
Learning takes time. Another important assumption is that learning about own self-
control takes time, i.e., an agent has to spend some period of time to update her beliefs.
4 This assumption is generically without loss of generality.
5 In period t = 1, we interpret the learning opportunity as the option for the agent to look back to
similar past experiences to infer her self-control problem. In period t ≥ 2, the agent can try to learn
about her own self-control problem from own past actions in the game.
6 Esponda and Pouzo (2016) provide a framework to analyze agents with misspecified models. Note
that our model is also different from their framework because in our model the agent can actively
choose whether or not to update her initial belief.
7 Precisely, the crucial assumption throughout our paper is that, as discussed in Footnote 8 of
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), a time-inconsistent type is “naive about her own naïveté,” and hence
cannot revise her beliefs unless she acquires information about her self-control. By contrast, all of
our results are qualitatively robust (and often become simpler) if a time-consistent type becomes
aware of her future self-control by inferring from the fact that she is currently time-consistent.
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In our model, this “time cost” is key in generating an intra-personal conflict between
future selves (and hence procrastination of learning). While this assumption is restrictive,
it captures the notion that we need to spend time to think about ourselves whenever
updating such beliefs.
In contrast, the cost of learning itself can be zero. While we highlight the case in which
the learning cost is zero (i.e., m = 0), we also investigate a case of positive learning
cost (i.e., m > 0) which represents a physical recollection cost or a psychological cost of
deteriorating self-esteem (Kőszegi, 2006; Gottlieb, 2014, 2016).
No commitment. In the model, the agent cannot commit to any particular future be-
havior, including future learning decisions. In Section 3.6, we discuss the case in which
an agent takes up a future commitment device. If the agent can commit to own future
actions, non-learning would not occur in our model with zero learning cost. In this re-
spect, our non-learning result complements the study by Ali (2011) which shows that
time-inconsistent people will perfectly learn about their self-control if they can take up a
flexible commitment device.
3.3 Task Completion
This section analyzes an illustrative example of task completion: we focus on the case
in which the agent has already initiated a task x = (c, b). To shed light on our main
mechanism in the simplest manner, we further assume in this section that the agent can
work on the task only after acquiring a signal about own self-control.8 We show that
even though both types of agents consider the task worthwhile, and even though the
task cannot be completed without acquiring information, the time-inconsistent agent will
procrastinate (potentially indefinitely) learning her type, even for m = 0. In Section 3.4,
we analyze a full model without these assumptions.
8One interpretation—as we formally investigate in Section 3.4—is that working on a task without
knowing own self-control is costly (e.g., the agent cannot optimize her workload) and the agent does
not want to engage in any task before learning about own self-control.
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3.3.1 Task Completion: Setup
The timing of this example is as follows. If the agent has not acquired a signal st ∈ {0, 1}
about her self-control problem, in each period she chooses to either acquire it (st = 1) or
not (st = 0). If the agent has acquired it, in each period the agent chooses whether to
complete the task or not.
Let k ∈ {C, I} be the agent’s (true) discounting type where C represents a time-consistent
type and I represents a time-inconsistent type. Let Ukt (x; τ−t) = −D(τ−t)c+D(τ−t+1)b
denote a type-k agent’s total utility (not taking into account the learning cost m) is
evaluated in period t when she completes task x in period τ . If the agent has already
encoded the signal (i.e., sτ0 = 1 for some τ0 < t), the cost of learning m ≥ 0 is sunk,
and hence the agent’s utility only depends on when she will complete the task. Before
encoding a signal, the agent’s subjective expectation of total utility evaluated in period
t when she acquires a signal about her type in period τ0 ≥ 0 by Uˆkt (sτ0 = 1).
In what follows, we focus on the most interesting case in which each type of agent prefers
to complete the task as soon as possible rather than never:
Assumption 3.1 (Task is worthwhile). (i) U I(x; 0) > 0, (ii) min{UC(x; 1), U It (x; 1)} > m.
Because UC(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; 0), Assumption 3.1 (i) implies that each type of agent prefers
to complete the task right now rather than never. Assumption 3.1 (ii) means that each
type of agent prefers to acquire information right now and complete the task in the next
period rather than never.9 Note that under Assumption 3.1 both types agree that the
task should be completed. Hence, uncertainty and naïveté about own future type is the
only reason for procrastination and for not completing the task.
9 If Assumption 3.1 (i) does not hold, the time-inconsistent agent never completes the task. In
this case, if the time-inconsistent agent would not want the task to be completed in any future
period or UC(x; 0) < 0, then obviously the time-inconsistent agent would never encode the signal.
Otherwise, the time-inconsistent agent may have an incentive to encode a signal, but still in this case
procrastinating information acquisition can occur. Regarding Assumption 3.1 (ii), if U IC(x; 1) < m,
then the time-consistent agent never encodes a signal. By contrast, even if U I(x; 1) < m, the
time-inconsistent agent may still acquire information when U I(x; 0) > 0.
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3.3.2 Task Completion: Analysis in a Finite Period Model
In this subsection, we analyze when procrastination will occur in a task completion setting
under a finite time horizon (i.e., T < ∞). This corresponds to environments in which
there is a deadline for task completion (e.g., filing a tax return).
Since the agent has to learn her type before completing the task, the earliest point in
time the task can be completed is t = 2, if information was acquired at t = 1. Because of
the finite time horizon, the equilibria can be identified through backward induction. The
agent’s decision problem is separated into the optimal timing of information acquisition
and the optimal time to complete the task, given the agent’s beliefs. In the following,
therefore, we analyze when the two types of agents choose to complete the task conditional
on having acquired information, and when they acquire information. Because we use
backward induction to pin down our equilibrium, we start by characterizing when the
different types of agents complete the task, conditional on already knowing their type.
Decisions after learning. By Assumption 3.1, the task is worthwhile for both types of
agents. Therefore, due to the properties of a finite horizon decision problem, if the agents
have learned their type, they will complete the task at the latest in the last period. Let
τ = min{τ |U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; τ)} denote the earliest period in which the agent prefers to
complete task immediately rather than in τ periods. By Assumption 3.1, both types of
agents complete the task in t = T if they have not yet done so. When the task will be
completed is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. Suppose T < ∞ and Assumption 3.1 holds. Consider a continuation game
in which the agent has already learned her type. Then,
(i) If the agent is time-consistent, she completes the task immediately.
(ii) If the agent is time-inconsistent, she completes the task in the first period t ≥ τ that
satisfies t = T − nτ where n ∈ N0.
Note that UC(x; k) = δkUC(x; 0) for the time-consistent type. Hence, in any period t,
the agent will always complete the task immediately if she is time consistent and the task
has not yet been completed.
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Lemma 3.1 (ii) implies that a time-inconsistent type completes the task in any τ period.
This result is based on O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999; 2001) and its intuition is as follows.
Because she is perfectly sophisticated about her future self-control after learning, she
knows she will complete the task in the last period and therefore not complete it in the
second to last period if U I(x; 0) < U I(x; 1). In the third to last period, she will complete
the task if she prefers completing it immediately over completing it in two periods (i.e.,
U I(x; 0) ≥ U I(x; 2)); otherwise, she will not. By induction, the agent completes the task
in any period t = T − nτ and there is a cycle of length τ . Note that this result is not
procrastination, as the agent has correct beliefs about when the task will be completed
and her actual decisions follow the beliefs.
Information acquisition. Next, we investigate conditions under which each type of agent
will acquire information. We focus on deriving the conditions for our equilibrium of
interest: an equilibrium in which the time-inconsistent type procrastinates information
acquisition and where the time-consistent type acquires information immediately.
We first analyze the actions for the time-consistent type. Note that in this case she is
underconfident about own future self-control: she thinks she will be time-inconsistent
with probability 1 − q. If U I(x; 1) ≤ U I(x; 0), nevertheless, she will complete the task
in the next period with probability one. Otherwise, she takes into account the delay in
case her future self would be time-inconsistent and, hence, would complete the task only
in period t = T − nτ . In the proof, we show that the most stringent condition to acquire
information in this case is that the agent expects a delay of τ periods in case her future
self would be time inconsistent. The result is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Suppose T < ∞ and Assumption 3.1 holds. If an agent is time-consistent,
she will acquire information in any continuation game if either of the following holds:
(i) U I(x; 1) ≤ U I(x; 0),
(ii) U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0) and q(1− δ)UC(x; 1) ≥ [1− δq − (1− q)δτ−1]m.
Note that Lemma 3.2 holds when m is close to zero or q is close to one.
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Next, we analyze the actions for the time-inconsistent type. First, we illustrate conditions
in which the time-inconsistent type postpones acquiring information at t = T−2. Because
t = T −1 is the last period she can acquire information to complete the task, Assumption
3.1 (ii) and Lemma 3.1 ensure that the agent will acquire information at t = T −1. Given
this, acquiring the information at t = T −2 will lead the time-consistent type to complete
the task at t = T − 1, but the time-inconsistent type will postpone the task until t = T
if U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0). Hence, for the time-inconsistent agent in period t = T − 2, the
subjective expected payoff from acquiring the information immediately is
Uˆ IT−2(sT−2 = 1) = −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 2).
If the agent postpones acquiring information, she (correctly) anticipates that she will
acquire it in the next period and complete the task with certainty in two periods. Hence,
the subjective expected payoff from not acquiring information at t = T − 2 is
Uˆ IT−2(sT−2 = 0) = −mD(1) + U I(x; 2).
Therefore, the time-inconsistent agent will prefer not to acquire information at t = T − 2
if
−mD(1) + U I(x; 2) > −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 2)
⇔ q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1−D(1)) > 0. (3.1)
Note that she will always prefer to postpone if U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1). Intuitively, a time-
inconsistent agent indirectly incurs a cost from learning because learning itself changes
own future actions in this case.
Given Inequality (3.1), we finally show the condition under which the time-inconsistent
type procrastinates acquiring information at t = T − 2: In period t = T − 3, she wrongly
believes that she would acquire information at t = T − 2 with positive probability on the
equilibrium path. Suppose that U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0) and Inequality (ii) holds.
Then, upon acquiring information at t = T − 3, the agent believes that she will complete
58
PROCRASTINATION AND LEARNING ABOUT SELF-CONTROL
the task in the next period if and only if her future type will be time-consistent. Hence,
Uˆ IT−3(sT−3 = 1) = −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 3).
If she does not acquire information at t = T − 3, she (wrongly) anticipates that she will
acquire information in the next period with probability q. Hence,
Uˆ IT−3(sT−3 = 0) = q(−mD(1) + U I(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−mD(2) + U I(x; 3)).
Note that the beliefs for her future learning decisions are wrong: in reality, if she does
not learn her own type in period t = T − 3, she will not do so in period t = T − 2
eiter (because her type is persistent over time). However, she is naive about this exactly
because she has not learned about it yet (and hence keeps using her initial prior belief).
Combining these two conditions, the agent will not acquire information at t = T − 3,
while wrongly believing that she would acquire information at t = T −2 with probability
q, if
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) +m(1− qD(1)) > m(1− q)D(2). (3.2)
Note that here the logic of procrastination — a time-inconsistent type overestimates own
future self-control (in our model, probabilistically) and hence not taking an action now
— is akin to the one in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001).
The logic and derivations are the same in periods t < T −3, although there are additional
conditions depending on τ . The result for procrastination until t = T − 1 is summarized
as follows:
Proposition 3.1. Suppose T < ∞ and Assumption 3.1 holds. If an agent is time-
inconsistent, she will procrastinate learning about own future self-control until t = T − 1
if U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0), Inequality (ii), and the following holds:
q(U I(x; 2)−U I(x; 1))+m(1−qD(1)) > max
n,k∈N
(1−q)[m ·D(nτ)−U I(x;nτ +k)+U I(x; k)].
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Moreover, this equilibrium outcome is unique.
To see the intuition, suppose that τ = 1, i.e., a time-consistent type always chooses
to acquire information and completes the task in every period. Intuitively, because a
time-consistent type is (probabilistically) overconfident about own future self-control,
she erroneously thinks that she will acquire information with probability q in the next
period, even when she does not do so now. Note that the time-inconsistent type evalu-
ates her anticipated future outcomes with her current (i.e., time-inconsistent) preferences.
Hence, as in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001), the time-inconsistent agent may pro-
crastinate information acquisition — in any period t < T − 1, she thinks that she would
acquire information with probability q in the next period, but actually will not do so with
probability one.
Perhaps surprisingly, and beyond the original logic of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999,
2001), our procrastination can occur even whenm = 0. This is because a time-inconsistent
agent indirectly incurs a cost from learning if U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1), unlike for quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. Corollary 3.1 highlights the result:
Corollary 3.1. Suppose T <∞ and U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0). Then, for any m ≥ 0,
there exists a q¯ < 1 such that for any q ∈ [q¯, 1), the time-consistent agent will acquire
information immediately while the time-inconsistent agent will procrastinate acquiring
information until t = T − 1 is a unique equilibrium outcome.
If the time-inconsistent agent is sufficiently naive (q sufficiently close to 1), she believes
that it is of little relevance to her when a time-inconsistent agent would acquire informa-
tion or complete the task. The only important concern is the behavior of a time-consistent
agent, but a time-consistent agent will always acquire information immediately and com-
plete the task immediately upon learning her type. Therefore, the time-inconsistent agent
believes that if she acquires information now, she is almost certainly going to complete
the task tomorrow (because q is close to one, and hence, she believes she will most likely
be time-consistent). If she does not acquire information, she believes that she will most
likely acquire it in the next period and then complete the task in two periods. The naive
time-consistent agent (erroneously) believes that this is the main trade-off she is facing:
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acquiring information today and completing the task tomorrow, or acquiring information
tomorrow and completing the task in two periods. If she prefers completing the task in
two periods over completing it in one period, she will postpone information acquisition
— leading to procrastination.10
3.3.3 Analysis: Infinite Horizon Model
In this subsection, we analyze under which conditions a time-inconsistent agent will
procrastinate learning information indefinitely, which implies never completing the task
on the equilibrium path.
We first specify the agent’s behavior in continuation games in which the agent has already
learned her type. If the agent learned that she is time-consistent, she chooses to complete
the task in any period because Assumption 3.1 (i) implies UCt (x; 0) = −c + δb > 0. If
the agent learned that she is time-inconsistent, Assumption 3.1 (i) ensures that there
exists an equilibrium in continuation games in which the agent completes the task in the
next period after learning. When showing the existence of a non-learning equilibrium,
we focus on such an equilibrium in continuation games. We then derive the condition in
which non-learning for time-inconsistent agents is a unique equilibrium outcome.
Next, we investigate the agent’s behavior regarding learning. First, suppose the agent
is time-consistent. In this case, Assumption 3.1 (ii) ensures that she chooses to learn
about own self-control. Second, suppose the agent is time-inconsistent, note that her
beliefs about own future actions depend on the beliefs about own future self-control. On
the one hand, the agent (wrongly) believes that she will be time-consistent and hence
choose to learn in the next period with probability q. On the other hand, she (correctly)
anticipates that she will not choose to learn in any future period with probability 1 − q
in our candidate equilibrium. To show the existence of the equilibrium, we first select an
equilibrium in continuation games in which if the time-inconsistent agent learns about
own self-control in period t, then she completes the task in period t + 1. Given these
10What the time-inconsistent agent fails to realize is that, because she prefers to postpone today she
in fact time-inconsistent and will therefore also be time-inconsistent tomorrow. In every period,
she is considering the same trade-off, reaching the same conclusion, and taking the same action:
postponing until the second to last period.
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beliefs, if the agent chooses not to learn, her anticipated expected utility is:
Uˆ It (st = 1) = q
[
−D(1)m+ U I(x; 2)
]
+ (1− q) · 0.
If the agent chooses to learn, her anticipated expected utility is:
Uˆ It (st = 0) = −m+ U I(x; 1).
Hence, the agent prefers not to learn if:
Uˆ It (st = 0) > Uˆ It (st = 1)
⇔ q
[
U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)
]
+m [1− qD(1)] > (1− q)U I(x; 1). (3.3)
Next, we derive the condition under which time-inconsistent agents never choose to learn
about their self-control problems—and hence never complete the task—in any equilibrium
outcome. Denote the maximum and minimum utility of a time-inconsistent agent from
completing a task by U I(x) = maxτ U I(x; τ) and U I(x) = minτ U I(x; τ), respectively.
Note that U I(x) > 0 ≥ U I(x) by Assumption 3.1 and limτ→∞ U I(x; τ) = 0. Then, a
lower bound of anticipated expected utility when time-inconsistent agents choose not to
learn is:
U It (st = 0) = q
[
−D(1)m+ U I(x; 2)
]
+ (1− q)
[
−D(1)m+ U I(x)
]
.
The agent knows how a time-consistent agent will behave. Hence, with probability q,
she believes she will be time-consistent in the next period, acquire the information, and
complete the task in two periods. But with probability 1 − q she believes she will be
time-inconsistent in the next period. In this case, the lowest possible payoff is to acquire
information immediately, but only completing the task in the least desired period.
Similarly, an upper bound of anticipated expected utility when the time-inconsistent
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agents choose to learn is:
U
I
t (st = 1) = −m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x).
Again, the action of the time-consistent agent is certain, but, with probability 1− q, the
agent believes she will be time-inconsistent in the next period.
Hence, in any equilibrium outcome, the agent prefers not to learn if:
q
[
U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)
]
+m [1−D(1)] > (1− q)
[
U
I(x)− U I(x)
]
. (3.4)
The result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds.
(i) If Inequality (3.3) holds, there exists an equilibrium in which a time-inconsistent agent
never learns about own future self-control (and hence never completes the task).
(ii) If Inequality (3.4) holds, a time-inconsistent agent never learns about own future
self-control in any equilibrium outcome (and hence never completes the task) .
The intuition of the result is two-fold. First, because the agent is time-inconsistent, she
may prefer to complete a task later rather than sooner. Specifically, if the agent prefers
to complete the task in two periods rather than in the next period (i.e., if U I(x; 2) >
U I(x; 1)), then the agent has an incentive to postpone acquiring the signal in order to
delay task completion. Second, because the agent is (probabilistically) overconfident
about own future self-control, she underestimates the likelihood that she will not acquire
the signal in the future. Specifically, if the degree of naïveté (i.e., q) is sufficiently large, the
agent (wrongly) believes that she will most likely acquire the signal in the next period and,
hence, she prefers not acquiring it now to delay task completion. The time-inconsistent
agent thereby fails to infer from her own actions that she cannot be time-consistent in
the next period and, hence, she repeatedly procrastinates.
It is worth mentioning that procrastination of learning about self-control can occur even
when the time-inconsistent agent prefers to do the task in the next period rather than
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never (i.e., U I(x; 1) > m). Intuitively, because the agent is overconfident about own
future self-control, she underestimates the possibility that she will procrastinate learning
in the future. As a result, she may prefer to postpone a valuable learning opportunity
again and again. Furthermore, if the agent is sufficiently naive and has preferences for a
delay, procrastination of learning self-control is a unique equilibrium outcome:
Corollary 3.2. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds and U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1). Then, there exists
q¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any q > q¯ a time-inconsistent agent never learns about own future
self-control (and hence never completes the task) in any equilibrium outcome.
Perhaps surprisingly, even when m = 0, not learning about self-control can occur in equi-
librium. Further, even when m = 0, non-learning self-control can be a unique equilibrium
outcome.
As an illustrative example, we discuss the case in which the agent’s discount function is
(modified) hyperbolic:
Example 3.1. Consider the case in which D(t) = 11+rtδt, r =
1
2 , and δ ' 1.
If m = 0, Assumption 3.1 holds if and only if b
c
> 32 . In this case, Inequality (3.3)
becomes:
q >
−20c+ 15b
−15c+ 12b.
When b
c
= 2315 , the condition under which procrastination can occur is q >
15
17 . Also, when
b
c
= 2315 and q >
15
17 , U
I(x) = U It (x; 2) and U I(x) = 0. Hence, by Inequality (3.4), a time-
inconsistent agent never learns about own future self-control (and hence never completes
the task) in any equilibrium outcome under these parameters.
If m
c
= 13 , Assumption 3.1 holds if and only if
b
c
> 2. In this case, Inequality (3.3)
becomes:
q >
−90c+ 45b
−65c+ 36b.
When b
c
= 9145 , the condition under which procrastination can occur is q >
5
39 .
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3.4 Task Choice
So far, we have assumed that the agent already faces a specific task to complete. This
section analyzes a situation where the agent has multiple tasks to choose from and where
the optimal choice depends on the agent’s type. For example, such a task could be to
choose between different financial contracts. As an illustrative example, we will focus on
a case where the agent is facing two possible tasks to choose from.
3.4.1 Analysis
Suppose that the agent can choose one of the following two tasks: x = (c, b) and x′ =
(0, b′) with −c + δb > δb′ > 0 > −c + D(1)b. As described in Section 3.2.1, we assume
that the task cannot be completed in the same period it is chosen. Unlike the illustrative
model analyzed in Section 3.3, however, in this full model we allow the agent to choose
a task without knowing her self-control problem.
We derive the conditions under which time-inconsistent agents never choose to learn
about own self-control problems nor choose a task in equilibrium.
First, we characterize the agent’s task-completion behavior. It is straightforward to show
that (i) if the agent takes up task x, she will choose to complete the task in every period
if she is time-consistent and will never complete the task if she is time-inconsistent, (ii)
if the agent takes up task x′, the agent will choose to complete the task in every period
irrespective of her type.
Second, suppose the agent has learned about her self-control, but has not yet chosen a
task. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the agent would choose x in any period
if she is time-consistent and would choose x′ in any period if she is time-inconsistent.
Third, suppose that the agent has neither learned about own self-control nor chosen a
task. If she is time-consistent, she strictly prefers learning about own self-control rather
than not doing anything if m is small (i.e., m < min{δ3b′, U I(x; 2)}).11 The perceived
11 Intuitively, cquiring information immediately implies incurring cost m with certainty, but only com-
pleting the task x in the future with perceived probability q, while doing nothing implies the infor-
mation cost will only be incurred if the agent is in fact time-consistent.
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expected utility of a time-consistent type for each action is as follows:
• Taking x without learning self-control: qUC(x; 1) + (1− q) · 0.
• Taking x′ without learning self-control: UC(x′; 1).
• Learning self-control: −m+ qUC(x; 2) + (1− q)UC(x′; 2).
• Not doing anything: q(−mδ + UC(x; 3)) + (1− q) · 0.
Hence, if the agent is time-consistent, she will choose to learn if and only if:
−m+ qUC(x; 2) + (1− q)UC(x′; 2) > max{qUC(x; 1), UC(x′; 1)}
or
(1− q)δ
1− δ U
C(x′; 0)− m
δ(1− δ) > qU
C(x; 0) > 1− (1− q)δ
δ
UC(x′; 0) + m
δ2
(3.5)
Note that this always holds for m = 0 if δ is close to one.
Consider the case in which Inequality (3.5) holds. Suppose that the agent has neither
learned about own self-control nor chosen a task and that the agent is time-inconsistent.
If she chooses to learn and she finds out that she will have time-consistent preferences in
the future, she expects that she will take up task x in the next period and then complete
it in two periods. Her perceived expected utility for each action is as follows:
• Taking x without learning self-control: qU I(x; 1) + (1− q) · 0.
• Taking x′ without learning self-control: U I(x′; 1).
• Learning self-control: −m+ qU I(x; 2) + (1− q)U I(x′; 2).
• Not doing anything: −mqD(1) + qU I(x; 3) + (1− q) · 0.
Hence, if the agent is time inconsistent, she will choose not to do anything if
U I(x; 3)−mD(1) > max
{
U I(x; 1), 1
q
U I(x′; 1), U I(x; 2) + 1− q
q
U I(x′; 2)− m
q
}
(3.6)
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and Inequality (3.5) hold.
The intuition here is threefold. First, if taking up a task without learning own self-
control is costly, the agent thinks that she will acquire the signal about own self-control
if she will be time-consistent (this happens whenever the agent has a sufficiently large δ).
Second, because the agent is time-inconsistent, she may prefer to complete a task later
rather than sooner. Specifically, if U I(x; 3) > max{U I(x; 1), U I(x; 2)}, the agent has an
incentive to postpone acquiring the signal to delay task completion. Third, because the
agent is (probabilistically) overconfident about own future self-control, she underestimates
the likelihood that she will not acquire the signal in the future. The next proposition
summarizes our main result:
Proposition 3.3. Consider the task choice model. If m < min{δ3b′, U I(x; 2)}, Inequality
(3.5), and Inequality (3.6) hold, there exists an equilibrium in which a time-inconsistent
agent never learns about own future self-control nor choose any task.
Proposition 3.3 highlights a perverse welfare effect of non-learning in our model: If the
inconsistent type would know that she is inconsistent, then she would choose task x′ which
gives her strictly positive utility. But because she believes that she is time-consistent
with a high probability, she believes that she will choose task x in the future with a high
probability, and therefore, she does nothing indefinitely.
As a real-world example, suppose that an agent has to choose whether to pursue a
university degree or do an apprenticeship. If she is time-consistent, she would go to
university this year. If she is time-inconsistent, the high upfront cost of the university
degree is too much for her, so she would choose the apprenticeship this year. But if she
is time-inconsistent and does not know her future type, she may believe that her future
selves would be time-consistent with a high probability and hence go to university next
year. This is why she does not start the apprenticeship this year. In fact, she will never
complete any further education.
In the following, we will use our preferred functional form of discounting D(t) = 11+rt
to show under which degree of naïveté q and under which parameter restrictions we can
observe an equilibrium where the time-inconsistent agent never chooses or completes a
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task.
First, we look at the case where the cost of acquiring information is zero.
Example 3.2. Consider the case in which D(t) = 11+rt , r =
1
2 , m = 0, and δ ' 1. Then,
the assumption −c + δb > 0 > −c + D(1)b holds if and only if b
c
∈ (1, 32). In this case,
Inequality 3.5 always holds. Inequality ( (3.6)) is equivalent to the following condition:
q > max
{
25b′
c+ 20b′ ,
15b′
4c
}
. (3.7)
Hence, for b′
c
< 15 there exists a q¯ < 1 such that for all q > q¯ a time-inconsistent agent
will never learn about own self-control and never initiate a task.
We already know that if m = 0 and δ = 1, then the time-consistent agent will always
choose to learn if she has taken no other action, and will always complete her chosen task
immediately if she has already initiated a task. Therefore, we only need to ensure that
inequality (3.6) is satisfied. What this example shows is that for (modified) hyperbolic
discounting, a sufficiently naive agent (q close to one) will procrastinate information
acquisition and task choice indefinitely if b′ is small. The intuition is as follows: if q is
large, the agent (wrongly) believes that it is likely that x is the optimal task. Therefore,
taking up task x′ becomes unattractive. But since the agent is time-inconsistent she might
wish to postpone the task, and taking up the task x immediately will lead to completion
in the next period with perceived probability q. Therefore, not doing anything is the only
way to commit to postpone the task completion, according to her beliefs.
In the example, if b′ approaches zero, the degree of naïveté q ensuring procrastination
goes to zero. This means that when the value of knowing that she is time-inconsistent
goes down, she becomes more likely to procrastinate and stick to a long-run suboptimal
decision. Similarly, if c increases while b
c
is fixed, the time-inconsistent agent is more
likely to procrastinate. As in the task completion setting, the time-inconsistent agent
is expecting to (most likely) be time-consistent in the future, but she is evaluating the
task x according to her own preferences — the preference of a time-inconsistent agent.
Despite knowing that a time-inconsistent agent would never complete the task x, she is
still attempting to commit herself to completing the task in three periods.
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In the next example, we look at what happens with positive information cost m.
Example 3.3. Consider the case in which D(t) = 11+rt , r =
1
2 , δ ' 1, m = c50 , and b
′
c
= 110 .
Then, the assumption −c + δb > 0 > −c + D(1)b holds if and only if b
c
∈ (1, 32). In this
case, Inequality (3.5) and (3.6) become:
4
5 > q > max
{
1
50 b
c
− 55 ,
15
44
}
. (3.8)
Hence, for b
c
∈ (98 , 32), there will is a range for q such that the time-consistent agent
acquires information, and the time-inconsistent agent never learns about own self-control
and never completes any of the tasks.
With a strictly positive information cost m, the time-consistent agent may choose to pick
a task without having acquired information. This poses restrictions on the degree of
naïveté q. Intuitively, if the agent believes she is particular type with sufficient certainty
(perhaps wrongly), the information has low perceived value and the agent will pick the
task she believes most likely to match her type. If the net value of the task x for the time-
consistent agent is sufficiently low, the condition (3.5) becomes binding. This means that
to ensure the time-consistent agent prefers acquiring information is a stronger requirement
on q than to have the time-inconsistent agent procrastinate.
If q is sufficiently high such that the time-consistent agent picks x without acquiring
information, the time-inconsistent agent no longer believes she can postpone the task for
as long as before. In this case, she might pick x′ to ensure the task x is not completed
too soon, resulting in a perceived negative payoff.
3.5 Procrastination and Misdirected Learning
This section investigates an extension to our basic model by including learning about
an additional payoff-relevant attribute: ability. Suppose that there are two initially-
uncertain attributes: self-control and ability. The agent is initially overconfident and
partially naive. The agent can acquire perfectly informative signals about either of the
two factors (or both; but not both in one period).
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As in our basic model, the agent is partially naive, but since we now have two factors
the agent is uninformed about, we need further notation. Let qd be the probability with
which the agent believes her discounting is exponential, i.e. the probability that she is
time-consistent, and let (1− qd) be the probability the agent attaches to having discount
function D(t), displaying time-inconsistent preferences. Additionally, the agent now has
beliefs about her ability. For simplicity we assume that there are only two ability types:
high ability, aH , and low ability, aL. The agent has beliefs aˆ about her ability a: she
believes with probability qa that she is of high ability, aH , and with probability (1− qa)
that she is of low ability, aL. Let ma ∈ R denote the cost of learning own ability. Where
ma can be negative.
3.5.1 Illustration
For illustrative purposes, we first examine a version of the model in which the agent has an
opportunity to learn about own ability only in t = 0, and then plays the game described
in Section 3.3. That is, the agent faces a task x with payoff (c, bi) where bi = aib depends
on ability. The agent, therefore, believes her expected ability is aˆ = qaH + (1 − q)aL,
and the expected delayed benefit of the task is aˆb = bˆ. With slight abuse of notation,
let Ukt (bi; τ − t) = −D(τ − t)c+D(τ − t+ 1)bi denote a type-k agent’s total utility (not
taking into account the learning cost m) evaluated in period t when she completes task
x in period τ .
First, consider the case in which maxτ U It (bˆ; τ) = U It (bˆ; 1), UCt (bL; 1) > 0, and U It (bL; 2) >
0 > U It (bL; 1). In this case, a time-inconsistent type never works on the task once she
learns that her ability is aL. However, from her t = 0 perspective, she wants to complete
the task. Also, because maxτ U It (bˆ; τ) = U It (bˆ; 1) (i.e., bH is sufficiently large), without
learning own ability, even a time-inconsistent type would immediately learn own self-
control and then complete the task. That is, the agent would strictly prefer to avoid
learning own ability to motivate her future self to complete the task, as analyzed by
Carrillo and Mariotti (2000) and Bénabou and Tirole (2002).
Second, consider the case in which U It (bH ; 1) > 0 > UCt (bL; 1). This implies that
UCt (bH ; 1) > 0 > U It (bL; 1). In this case, each type of agent never works on the task
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once she learns that her ability is aL. Since information regarding ability is valuable, a
time-consistent type chooses to learn at t = 0. As q → 1, a time-inconsistent type also
(wrongly) believes that, almost surely, she will behave as if she would be time-consistent.
Precisely, if Inequality (3.3) holds, then both time-consistent and time-inconsistent types
strictly prefer to acquire information about own ability at t = 0.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose T = ∞ and the agent has an opportunity to learn own ability
only in t = 0.
(i) Assume maxτ U It (bˆ; τ) = U It (bˆ; 1), UCt (bL; 1) > 0, U It (bL; 2) > 0 > U It (bL; 1), and
ma = 0. If q is sufficiently close to 0, there exists an equilibrium in which a time-
inconsistent agent strictly prefers to not learn own ability and then completes the task at
t = 2.
(ii) Assume U It (bH ; 1) > 0 > UCt (bL; 1) and ma = 0. If Inequality (3.3) holds, there
exists an equilibrium in which a time-inconsistent agent strictly prefers to learn about
own ability, but then never learns about own future self-control nor completes the task.
Although our result may look close to the literature on strategic ignorance (Carrillo
and Mariotti, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002), the mechanisms are quite different. In
the literature, an agent chooses not to learn about own ability as a means of internal
commitment to improve own future payoffs. In this sense, the result in Proposition 3.4
(i) is in line with the literature.
By contrast, in Proposition 3.4 (ii) the agent chooses not to learn about own future
self-control because she is naive about own future self-control and hence procrastinates
learning. Indeed, non-learning about own self-control in our model is harmful from the
agent’s long-run perspective because it leads to a non-completion of a task. In this case,
the agent also acquires information about own ability even though it never benefits her
(indeed, acquiring it strictly lowers the agent’s long-run utility). In this sense, Proposition
3.4 (ii) highlights how the agent’s endogenous learning decisions may be misdirected—she
chooses to learn what she should not learn from the long-run perspective, and she chooses
not to learn what she should.
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3.6 Extensions and Discussion
Another way of modeling (partial) naïveté is having preferences being stochastic in each
period, i.e., the true probability of being time-inconsistent in each period is q and its
realization is i.i.d. across time, but the agent anticipates that it is qˆ. In the limit case
where q = 0, we are in the same world as our model, but with a different form of (partial)
naïveté. This means that the optimal decision given full information has not changed,
only the perceived optimal action from the perspective of partially naive agents.
We have briefly discussed the implications of allowing for commitment in our model. In
the task-completion model, both agents will immediately commit to completing the task
in their preferred period. For the time-consistent type, she commits to complete the task
as soon as possible. For the time-inconsistent agent type, she commits to complete the
task in the future period that maximized the payoff for the agent from the perspective of
the current period. From Assumption 3.1, we know the time-inconsistent agent will have
a positive utility from completing the task when she completes it. As is described, the
non-commitment assumption is crucial in our results.
Because the non-learning in our model can occur even for m = 0, they may also occur
for some small m < 0. It implies that agents may be willing to pay some cost to stay
ignorant, or will forgo small positive payoffs from learning her type today.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a new mechanism for why people do not learn about their naïveté over
time. We find that individuals may procrastinate a free learning opportunity indefinitely,
even though having the information would make the agent better off. We also find that
the more biased a time-inconsistent agent’s beliefs are, the more likely she is to stay naive.
Our results do not rely on agents having image concerns or on using overconfidence as
commitment. Indeed, naïveté in our model has no benefits to the agent and hence is
purely harmful.
One potential future direction of research is applying it to situations which involve strate-
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gic interactions between players. For example, when firms offer contracts which specify
a base contract and a set of options, they often have an incentive to make consumers
procrastinate canceling or switching the option when a fraction of consumers are naive
(DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2010; Murooka and Schwarz,
2018). Our results imply that firms may have an incentive to make consumers endoge-
nously procrastinate learning about own naïveté by setting an appropriate contract and
pricing structures. How the procrastination of learning about own naïveté can be inter-
acted with strategic concerns of other parties is left for future research.
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Appendix A
Packaging of Sin Goods - Commitment or Exploita-
tion?
Relaxing the assumption of observable degree of sophistication (monopolistic case)
In the main text, we assumed that the monopolist can distinguish between the naive and
the sophisticated consumer. We now discuss what happens if we relax this assumption.
Suppose first that the monopolist caters to the naive self 1 by offering (x∗1, t∗1). Then
v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 ≥ u(x∗0)− c x∗0.
The sophisticated consumer pays transfer u(x∗0) − u(x∗1) + v(x∗1) for x∗0. Similarly, he
would pay u(xS0 ) − u(x∗1) + v(x∗1) for xS0 . The naive consumer has no willingness to
pay for commitment. Thus, the naive self 0 would not choose x∗0 or xS0 as the associated
transfer (which extracts the sophisticated consumer’s willingness to pay for commitment)
is too high. But the sophisticated consumer would prefer buying (x∗1, t∗1) over buying x∗0
or xS0 . The transfers for these quantities are constructed such that the sophisticated
consumer is indifferent between buying at time 0 and buying x∗1 at time 1. Therefore, the
sophisticated consumer is paying to avoid the higher shopping cost k1. If the sophisticated
consumer can not be identified, and hence can buy x∗1 at time 0, the consumer can avoid
the shopping cost k1 and hence keep rents from the transaction. In order to avoid the
sophisticated consumer imitating the naive, the monopolist will either have to subtract
k1 from the time 0 transfer to again make the sophisticated consumers indifferent, offer
the same bundle to all consumers, or exclude the naive consumers.
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Suppose next the monopolist caters to the naive self 0. Then u(x∗0)−c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)−c x∗1−
k1. Note that then v(x∗0)− c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 also holds. Hence, the sophisticated
consumer also receives x∗0. But since the monopolist prefers to offer x∗0 at a higher transfer
to the sophisticated consumer than to the naive consumer the monopolist either offers
only (x∗0, tS0 ) and serves only the sophisticated consumers or offers (x∗0, t∗0) and serves both
types or offers both (x∗0, tS0 − k1) and (x∗1, t∗1) again offering both types. What is optimal
depends on the share of naive and sophisticated consumers, and the shopping cost k1.
If, for example, the share of sophisticated consumers is large, he prefers to offer x∗0 at
the higher transfer and not serve the naive consumers. If the share is small he prefers
serving everyone the same quantity-transfer pair, but there may exist an intermediate
share where it is optimal to serve sophisticated consumers (x∗0, tS0 − k1), and the naive
(x∗1, t∗1). In this case the loss in profits from subtracting the shopping cost k1 to make the
sophisticated consumers indifferent, is smaller than the gain in profits from serving naive
consumers at time 1.
Suppose u(x∗0) − c x∗0 ≤ v(x∗1) − c x∗1 − k1, then the monopolist will either exclude naive
consumers and serve sophisticated consumers (x∗0, tS0 ) or (xS0 , tS0 ), or serve sophisticated
consumers (x∗0, tS0 − k1) or (xS0 , tS0 − k1) and serve the naive consumers (x∗1, t∗1).
Proposition A.1. Suppose the monopolist cannot distinguish naive and sophisticated con-
sumers.
1. Suppose u(x∗0)− c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1. Then
(a) For large shares of naive consumers the monopolist will offer (x∗0, t∗0) to all
consumers.
(b) For small shares of naive consumers (x∗0, tS0 ) to sophisticated consumers, ex-
cluding naive consumers.
(c) For intermediate share of naive consumers potentially offer (x∗0, tS0 − k1) to
sophisticated consumers and (x∗1, t∗0) to naive consumers.
2. Suppose v(x∗0)− c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 ≥ u(x∗0)− c x∗0. Then
(a) For large shares of naive consumers the monopolist will offer (x∗0, tS0 − k1) to
sophisticated consumers and (x∗1, t∗1) to naive consumers.
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(b) For small shares of naive consumers the monopolist will offer (x∗0, tS0 ) to so-
phisticated consumers and exclude naive consumers.
3. Suppose v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 ≥ v(x∗0)− c x∗0. Then
(a) For large shares of naive consumers the monopolist will offer (xS0 , tS0 − k1) to
sophisticated consumers and (x∗1, t∗1) to naive consumers.
(b) For small shares of naive consumers the monopolist will offer (xS0 , tS0 ) to so-
phisticated consumers and exclude naive consumers.
Proof. Assume λ is the share of naive consumers, and u(x∗0) − c x∗0 ≥ v(x∗1) − c x∗1 − k1.
Then the firms options are: serve everyone at time 0, (x0, t0) = (x∗0, u(x∗0)), only serve
sophisticated, (x0, t0) = (x∗0, u(x∗0) + v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)), or serve sophisticated at time 0 and
naive at time 1, (x0, t0) = (x∗0, u(x∗0) + v(x∗1) − u(x∗1) − k1), (x1, t1) = (x∗1, v(x∗1)). This
gives the following profits for the firm respectively:
Pooling: u(x∗0)− c x∗0
Sophisticated: (1− λ)(u(x∗0) + v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)− c x∗0)
Split: λ(v(x∗1)− c x∗1) + (1− λ)(u(x∗0) + v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)− k1 − c x∗0)
Comparing these profits pairwise yields the following cutoffs:
Split equilibrium over pooling:
λ ≤ v(x
∗
1)− u(x∗1)− k1
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 − (u(x∗1)− c x∗1)
.
Sophisticated over pooling:
λ ≤ v(x
∗
1)− u(x∗1)
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 + v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)
.
Split equilibrium over sophisticated:
λ ≥ k1
v(x∗1)− c x∗1
.
77
PACKAGING OF SIN GOODS
From this we have that there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that the monopolist is indifferent
between only serving sophisticated and serving the two types at separate times. We also
have that λ ∈ (0, 1) such that the monopolist is indifferent between serving types at
different times and serving everyone at time 0. But it might always be preferred to serve
everyone at time 0 over splitting the consumers. If:
v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)− k1
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 − (u(x∗1)− c x∗1)
∈ (0, 1).
The monopolist will only serve sophisticated if:
λ ≤ k1
v(x∗1)− c x∗1
.
The monopolist will serve types at different times if:
k1
v(x∗1)− c x∗1
≤ λ ≤ v(x
∗
1)− u(x∗1)− k1
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 − (u(x∗1)− c x∗1)
.
And serve everyone at time 0 if:
λ ≥ v(x
∗
1)− u(x∗1)− k1
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 − (u(x∗1)− c x∗1)
.
If:
v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)− k1
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 − (u(x∗1)− c x∗1)
/∈ (0, 1)
the monopolist will serve sophisticated if:
λ ≤ v(x
∗
1)− u(x∗1)
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 + v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)
.
And serve everyone at time 0 if:
λ ≥ v(x
∗
1)− u(x∗1)
u(x∗0)− c x∗0 + v(x∗1)− u(x∗1)
.
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Assume u(x∗0)−c x∗0 ≤ v(x∗1)−c x∗1−k1. Then the pooling equilibrium becomes (x∗1, v(x∗1)−
k1), the split equilibrium only changes in that sophisticated consumers now demand
xS0 ≥ x∗0. Comparing the profits of pooling and split equilibrium shows that split is
always preferred over pooling. Hence there will only be one cutoff, where the monopolist
is indifferent between only serving sophisticated consumers, and serving sophisticated at
time 0 and naive at time 1. The cutoff is unchanged from before, and hence for:
λ ≥ k1
v(x∗1)− c x∗1
the monopolist will only serve sophisticated, and otherwise serve consumers at different
times.
Relaxing the assumption of on-the-spot-production (monopolistic case)
The solution for the naive consumer in the monopolistic market does not rely on the
assumption that on-the-spot-production is feasible. So consider the sophisticated con-
sumer. If the monopolist cannot produce on the spot, then, when facing a sophisticated
consumer, he maximizes his profits subject to the participation constraint of self 0 and/or
self 1. The solution coincides with the solution for the naive consumer. So the monopolist
does not offer partial commitment to self 0 any longer.
Proof of the contract for the naive self 1 in a competitive market
Suppose first that PC1 binds. Rewrite it to get t1 = v(x0 + x1) − k1 − max{v(x0), v¯∗}
and plug t1 into the objective function. Then we can write the problem of the firm as
maxx1 v(x0 +x1)−c x1−k1−max{v(x0), v¯∗}. The first order condition is v′(x0 +x1) = c.
Hence, by the definition of x∗1 it follows that x0 + x1 = x∗1, i.e., x1 = x∗1 − x0. Thus,
v∗ = v(x∗1)− k1− c (x∗1− x0) and t1 = c (x∗1− x0). Finally, note that max{v(x0), v¯∗} = v∗
whenever v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 ≥ v(x0)− c x0.
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Package sizes
In the competitive equilibrium, there are either one or three package sizes as described
in the main text. For the equilibrium with three quantities (x∗0, xS0 and x∗1 − x∗0), we ask
how these relate to one another in size. We can rewrite the condition of optimal choice
of xS0 as:
k1 = v(x∗1)− v(xS0 )− c(x∗1 − xS0 )
For k1 > 0 we have that xS0 ∈ (x∗0, x∗1). From this we can see that for k1 small enough
we can get xS0 arbitrarily close to x∗1, though xS0 < x∗1. Since we have assumed three
quantities we have xS0 > x∗0, though for k1 high enough we can get arbitrarily close to x∗0.
The question is then how x∗1−x∗0 relate to the other two quantities. If x∗1 < 2x∗0 implying
the consumer will want to consume less than twice the amount when present biased
compared to when not, the top-up quantity x∗1 − x∗0 is smaller than x∗0 and hence the
top-up quantity is the smallest in the market.
When does this arise? Suppose, using the present-bias formulation outlined in footnote
5, that u(x) = b(x)−κ(x) and v(x) = b(x)−β κ(x). Intuitively, the larger β, i.e., the less
severe the self-control problem, the closer x∗1 is to x∗0 (for β = 1, x∗1 = x∗0) and thus, the
more likely x∗1 < 2x∗0 holds. Assuming, e.g., a linear delayed cost function (k(x) = κx)
and a quadratic or logarithmic immediate benefit function (b(x) = ln x or b(x) =
√
x)
shows that x∗1 < 2x∗0 arises for all β > 12 (and possibly for all β ∈ (0, 1), depending on
κ and c). For a linear current benefit function (b(x) = b x) and a quadratic delayed cost
function (κ(x) = x22 ), x
∗
1 < 2x∗0 arises for β > 12 . Using a real effort task, Augenblick,
Niederle and Sprenger 2013 estimate a β around 0.9. That is, β > 12 seems the empirical
plausible size of the present bias.
If on the other hand x∗1 > 2x∗0 the quantity x∗0 is smaller, and since we can find a k1 so
that xS0 is arbitrarily close to x∗0, it is even possible that the top up quantity is the biggest
in the market. This will happen if the present bias is severe, so that x∗1 >> x∗0 and k1 is
large such that xS0 − x∗0 is small.
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Proof Proposition 1.2
The proof for the sophisticated consumer is in the text. So consider the naive consumer.
Suppose it is optimal to sell some quantity x0 > 0 to self 0 and x1 > 0 to self 1. Then
it follows from the participation constraint of self 0 that t0 = u(x0). And from the
participation constraint of self 1 it follows that t1 = v(x0 + x1) − k1 − v(x0). Thus, the
monopolist maximizes v(x0 + x1)− v(x0) + u(x0)− c (x0 + x1) over x0 and x1. The first
order conditions are:
x0 : v′(x0 + x1)− v′(x0) + u′(x0) ≤ c with equality if x0 > 0,
x1 : v′(x0 + x1) ≤ c with equality if x1 > 0.
The two first order conditions cannot hold with equality at the same time. Hence, either
x0 > 0 and x1 = 0, or x0 = 0 and x1 > 0. In the former case the optimal transfer and
quantity are determined by:
u′(x∗0) = c and t∗0 = u(x∗0).
In the latter case, the optimal transfer and quantity are determined by:
v′(x∗1) = c and t∗1 = v(x∗1)− k1
Whether it is optimal to cater to the interest of self 0 or self 1 depends on whether
v(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1 is smaller or larger than u(x∗0)− c x∗0.
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Partial naïveté
Let vˆ(x) = vθ(x) = (1 − θ)u(x) + θ v(x). Where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter capturing the
severity of naivety.1 Then if:
ν(x∗0)− cx∗0 > ν(x∗1)− c x∗1 − k1,
even perfectly sophisticated consumers will chose x∗0 since this is sufficient to prevent self
1 from shopping. In this case, firms offer full commitment for all consumers. If:
ν(x∗0)− cx∗0 ≥ νθ(x∗1)− cx∗1 − k1,
where x∗1 ≡ arg maxx νθ(x)− c x, self 1 is not willing to buy any x > x∗0. But he is if:
ν(x∗0)− cx∗0 ≤ ν(x∗1)− cx∗1 − k1.
Partially naive consumers will purchase x∗0 at τ = 0, believing that this will be sufficient
to overcome self-control problems, but at τ = 1 self 1’s preferences have changed more
than self 0 anticipated, and it is now optimal for self 1 to go shopping. This means, that
partially naive consumer will act like naive consumers, and go shopping. If:
ν(x∗0)− cx∗0 ≤ νθ(x∗θ)− cx∗θ − k1,
self 0 will demand a quantity xSθ ∈ [x∗0, x∗θ) xSθ < xS0 such that:
ν(xSθ )− c xSθ = νθ(x∗θ)− cx∗θ − k1.
But per definition of xS0 , xSθ will not be sufficiently big to prevent self 1 from shopping.
With partial naïveté, firms will offer the same packaging sizes as in the baseline model,
but with introduction of the sizes xSθ and x∗1 − xSθ . If the consumers in the market have
1 If ν(x) = b(x)−βκ(x) and u(x) = b(x)−κ(x) then θ is a measure of the consumer’s belief, βˆ, about
β. Such that θ = 0 corresponds to βˆ = 1 and θ = 1 corresponds to βˆ = β.
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continuous levels of naïveté we will have that competitive firms offer a continuous range
of packaging sizes.
Circle Model with monopolistic competition
We assume a fraction λ of consumers are naive, and a fraction 1 − λ are sophisticated.
Consumers are distributed uniformly along a unit circle. Firms have costs c x + h of
offering a quantity.
Suppose that n firms have entered the market. In a symmetric equilibrium, firms locate
at equal distance along the circle. Consider a consumer located at θ ∈ (0, 1
n
) on the circle.
Suppose firm i locates at location 0 and firm i+1 at location 1
n
. The utility specifications
of the consumers in this setting are at time 0 if he buys from firm i u(x0)−k0
(
1
2 + θ
)
−t0,
and at time 1: ν(x1) −
(
1
2 + θ
)
k1 − t1. The
(
1
2 + θ
)
formulation instead of just θ is to
ensure at least partial commitment is possible. If θ = 0 and no other fixed shopping cost
exists, a self 0 would never be able to prevent a self 1 consumer from shopping, hence the
inclusion of a k02 . If he buys from firm i+1 his utility at time 0 is u(x0)−k0
(
n+2
2n − θ
)
−t0
(analogue for time 1).
Analysis With n firms, making zero profit and x∗0 being sufficient for commitment, the
transfers will be:
1
n
(t0 − cx∗0)− h = 0 ⇔ t = cx∗0 + nh.
In order to find the level of entry, we need to identify the consumer indifferent between
shopping at either of two firms:
u(x0)− k0
(
θ + 12
)
− t′ = u(x0)− k0
(
n+ 2
2n − θ
)
− t′′
⇔ θn = t
′′ − t′
2k0
+ 12n.
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Since the firm will offer the same transfer to all consumers, the profit maximization
problem for pricing an offered variety becomes:
max
t′
(t′ − c x∗0) θn.
This gives the following first order condition:
−t
′ − c x∗0
2k0
+
(
t′′ − t′
2k0
+ 12n
)
= 0.
Assuming symmetric strategies t′ = t′′ and we get t′ = t′′ = c x∗0 + k0n . Using the zero
profit condition yields the following level of entry at time 1:
1
n
(
c x∗0 +
k0
n
− c x∗0
)
− h = 0 ⇔
√k0
h
 = n0.
In this case, all consumers receive full commitment. If x∗0 is not sufficient for commitment,
naive consumers will still demand x∗0 at time 0, and as usual we have, that at time 1, the
optimal quantity to offer is x∗1−x∗0. The difference now being, that naive consumers only
constitute a fraction λ of the population. This means that the profit and transfer for a
firm serving naive consumers is:
λ
n
(t0 − cx∗0)− h = 0 ⇔ t = cx∗0 +
nh
λ
.
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Appendix B
The limited Potential of Partial-Commitment
B.0.1 Proposition 2.1
The agent completes the task whenever −c+ βb ≥ −k ↔ k + βb ≥ c, and gets b but has
to pay c. With the residual probability the agent does not complete the task and has to
pay k. Therefore, the agent’s expected payoff from choosing commitment level k is:
U(k) = Pr(−c+ βb ≥ −k)(b− E [c|c ≤ βb+ k])− k · Pr(−c+ βb < −k).
And since Pr(−c+ βb ≥ −k) = F (k + βb), this becomes:
U(k) = F (βb+ k)(b− E [c|c ≤ βb+ k])− k(1− F (βb+ k)).
To find the optimal interiors solution we can differentiate to get:
f(βb+ k)b− (βb+ k)f(βb+ k)− 1 + F (βb+ k) + k · f(βb+ k) = 0,
where:
∂
∂k
F (βb+ k)E [c|c ≤ βb+ k] = (βb+ k)f(βb+ k).
This means that if an interior best commitment device exists, the following condition
holds in optimum:
b(1− β) = 1− F (βb+ k)
f(βb+ k) .
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For the second order condition to be satisfied it must be that:
f ′(βb+ k)b(1− β) + f(βb+ k) < 0 ⇔ b(1− β) > f(βb+ k)−f ′(βb+ k) ,
where f ′(·) < 0 is necessary. Combined, this gives:
b(1− β) = 1− F (βb+ k)
f(βb+ k) >
f(βb+ k)
−f ′(βb+ k) > 0.
Consider some β′ and β′′ and some k′, then it is always possible to find some k′′ s.t.
bβ′+ k′ = bβ′′+ k′′ ⇔ k′′ = b(β′− β′′) + k′. It is therefore possible to vary b(1− β) while
keeping 1−F (βb+k)
f(βb+k) >
f(βb+k)
−f ′(βb+k) fixed. The right hand side, b(1−β), is maximized for β = 0
where it takes the value b. Therefore, if:
b >
1− F (βb+ k)
f(βb+ k) >
f(βb+ k)
−f ′(βb+ k) > 0,
for some (βb+ k) ∈ [c, c], then it is possible to find a β s.t. there is an interior optimum,
or:
b >
1− F (c′)
f(c′) >
f(c′)
−f ′(c′) > 0,
for some c′ ∈ [c, c]. The ratio 1−F (x)
f(x) is the Mills ratio. Differentiating this gives:
∂
∂x
1− F (x)
f(x) = −
f(x)
f(x) −
(1− F (x))
f(x)2 f
′(x).
The derivative is positive if:
−f(x)
f(x) −
(1− F (x))
f(x)2 f
′(x) > 0⇔ −f(x) > (1− F (x))
f(x) f
′(x),
under the assumption that f ′(x) < 0, this gives:
− f(x)
f ′(x) <
(1− F (x))
f(x) ,
which is exactly what follows from the first and second order conditions. Therefore,
the necessary conditions to ensure partial commitment is optimal are f ′(c) < 0 and an
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increasing Mills ratio of F (c). In this case, it will always be possible to find a b large
enough for the conditions to be satisfied, but due to the assumption that βb < c, such a
b might not overall exist.
B.0.2 Lemma 2.3
For a discrete distribution, the expected payoff from commitment level k is still:
U(k) = Pr(−c+ βb ≥ −k)(b− E [c|c ≤ βb+ k])− k · Pr(−c+ βb < −k).
Consider the case where there are n cost levels that realize with positive probability. Then
the costs can be ordered such that c = c1 < c2 < . . . < cn = c with supp(f) = {c1, . . . ; cn},
and with f(ci) the probability that ci realizes for ci(f). Then the expected payoff from a
commitment level k is:
U(k) =
∑
ci≤k+βb
f(ci)(b− ci)− k ·
∑
ci>k+βb
f(ci),
where ci ∈ supp(f). For any k ∈ [ci−βb, ci+1−βb) the first sum is constant, but the second
sum is increasing in k, therefore, k = ci−βb strictly dominates any k ∈ (ci−βb, ci+1−βb).
Therefore, the only commitment devices the agent considers are of the form ki = ci − βb
for ci ∈ supp(f). Under the assumption that b < E[c], the agent gets zero payoff from no
commitment. This means that the agent will demand partial commitment if there exist
a ki = ci − βb for ci ∈ supp(f) s.t. U(ki) > 0, or:
max
ci
U(k = ci − βb) = max
ci
ci∑
c=c
f(c)(b− c)− k(1−
ci∑
c=c
f(c)).
Plugging in k = ci − βb and rearranging gives:
max
ci
U(k = ci − βb) = max
ci
βb− ci +
ci∑
c=c
f(c) (b(1− β) + ci − c) > 0.
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B.0.3 Proposition 2.2
If there are only two possible costs c ∈ {c, c}, where c < b < c, and where the probability
of c occurring is p, partial commitment implies that the time-inconsistent agent completes
the task if c = c (βb − c ≥ −k) but not if c = c (βb − c < −k). The agent’s preferred
partial commitment is therefore k = c− βb.
The agent prefers the partial commitment over no commitment if:
(b− c)p− k(1− p) = (b− c)p− (c− βb)(1− p) ≥ 0⇔ β ≥ c− b · p
b(1− p)
and partial commitment over full commitment if:
(b− c)p− k(1− p)b− cp− c(1− p)⇔ (b− c)p− (c− βb)(1− p) ≥ b− cp− c(1− p),
which gives:
β ≥ 1− c− c
b
,
under the assumption that the task will never be completed absent a commitment device,
meaning βb− c < 0. Which gives β < c
b
. There always exist ranges of β for which perfect
commitment is optimal. For b < E[c]:
c− b · p
b(1− p) <
c
b
⇔ b > c,
which is true by assumption. For b > E[c]:
1− c− c
b
<
c
b
⇔ c > b,
which is also true by assumption.
B.0.4 Three Costs
Consider an agent with present bias parameter β facing a task with with delayed benefit
b and immediate costs c where c ∈ {c1, c2, c3} and where the probability of each cost is
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p1, p2 and p3 respectively. Assume c1 > βb — implying absent commitment the task will
never be completed — and c1 < b < c3. The only two partial commitment devices the
agent would consider are k1 = c1 − bβ and k2 = c2 − bβ. Where k1 ensures the task will
be completed for c = c1 and otherwise not, and k2 ensures the task will be completed for
c1 and c2 but not for c3.
The payoff from choosing k1 is:
U(k1) = p1(b− c1)− k1(p2 + p3) = p1(b− c1)− (c1 − βb)(p2 + p3).
The payoff from choosing k2 is:
U(k2) = p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)− k2p3 = p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)− (c2 − βb)p3.
The agent prefers k1 over k2 if:
U(k1) > U(k2)⇔ β > 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
.
Choosing k1 is preferred over no commitment if:
U(k1) = p1(b− c1)− (c1 − βb)(p2 + p3) > 0⇔ β > c1 − p1b
p2 + p3
.
Choosing k1 is preferred over full commitment if:
U(k1) = p1(b−c1)−(c1−βb)(p2+p3) > b−p1c1−p2c2−p3c3 ⇔ β > b+ c1
b
− p2c2 + p3c3
b(p2 + p3)
.
Choosing k2 is preferred over no commitment if:
U(k2) = p1(b−c1)+p2(b−c2)−(c2−βb)p3 > 0⇔ β > c1 − b(1− p3) + (c2 − c1)(p2 + p3)
p3b
.
Choosing k2 is preferred over full commitment if:
U(k2) = p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)− (c2 − βb)p3 > b− p1c1 − p2c2 − p3c3 ⇔ β > c2 + b− c3
b
.
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These inequalities lead to the following results:
Result B.1. Given b < E[c] and c1 < b < c2 < c3, a sophisticated agent will:
Prefer perfect commitment if:
β > max
{
1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
,
c1 − p1b
p2 + p3
}
.
Complete the task with higher probability than a time-consistent agent if:
β ∈
{
c1 − b(1− p3) + (c2 − c1)(p2 + p3)
p3b
, 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
}
.
Result B.2. Given b < E[c] and c1 < c2 < b < c3, a sophisticated agent will:
Prefer perfect commitment if:
β ∈
{
c1 − b(1− p3) + (c2 − c1)(p2 + p3)
p3b
, 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
}
.
Complete the task with lower probability than a time-consistent agent if:
β > max
{
1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
,
c1 − p1b
p2 + p3
}
.
Since neither of these conditions depend on c3 it is always possible to find a c3 such that
b < E[c] is satisfied. There are several other things to note: Increasing the spread of c but
keeping the probabilities fixed increases the likelihood of demanding perfect commitment,
and of demanding partial commitment overall. A smaller self-control problem makes the
agent more likely to choose the weaker commitment k1, but it does not necessarily make
the agent more likely to behave as a time-consistent agent.
Result B.3. Given b > E[c] and c1 < b < c2 < c3, a sophisticated agent will:
Prefer perfect commitment if:
β > max
{
1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
,
b+ c1
b
− p2c2 + p3c3
b(p2 + p3)
}
.
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Complete the task with higher probability than a time-consistent agent if:
β ∈
{
b+ c2 − c3
b
, 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
}
.
Result B.4. Given b > E[c] and c1 < c2 < b < c3, a sophisticated agent will:
Prefer perfect commitment if:
β ∈
{
b+ c2 − c3
b
, 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
}
.
Complete the task with lower probability than a time-consistent agent if:
β > max
{
1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
,
b+ c1
b
− p2c2 + p3c3
b(p2 + p3)
}
.
Again, if the spread of c increases, keeping the probabilities and expected cost fixed, the
probability of an agent preferring partial commitment goes up. For low β, no type of
partial commitment is optimal, but as β increases the agent will eventually switch form
the stronger commitment to the weaker commitment.
B.0.5 Partial Naivete
The valuation of an intermediate commitment device k is:
U(k) = Pr(βb− c ≥ −k)(b− E[c|βb− c ≥ −k])− k · Pr(βb− c ≥ −k),
where:
Pr(βb− c ≥ −k)E[c|βb− c ≥ −k] = Pr(βb− c ≥ −k)
∫ c
c
c
Pr(c, βb− c ≥ −k)
Pr(βb− c ≥ −k) dc,
which gives:
∫ c
c
cPr(c)Pr(βb− c ≥ −k)dc =
∫ c
c
cf(c)
(
1− Gˆ
(
c− k
b
))
dc.
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Define z = c − βb and let Fz(x) and fz(x) be the cdf and pdf of z, then the agent’s
expected value of an intermediate commitment device k is:
U(k) = Fz(k)b−
∫ c
c
cf(c)
(
1− Gˆ
(
c− k
b
))
dc− k(1− Fz(k)).
Which leads to the following optimality condition:
(k + b)fz(k) =
1
b
∫ c
c
cf(c)gˆ
(
c− k
b
)
dc+ 1− Fz(k).
B.0.6 Example With Three Cost-Levels
Assume that b(β − β) < c2 − c1. The agent will choose between no commitment, partial
commitment with k1 = c1 − βb, and partial commitment with k2 = c2 − βb. The agent
will prefer perfect alignment of preferences over the stricter partial commitment if:
U(k1) = p1(b− c1)− k1(p2 + p3) > p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)− k2p3 = U(k2),
which leads to the condition:
β > 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
,
which means that for any cost distribution there is a lower bound to β such that any agent
who attaches zero belief to having a worse present bias than β will prefer a commitment
device that perfectly aligns preferences. Assuming that β > 1 − c2−c1
b
p2+p3
p2
, an agent
prefers the commitment device with k = k1 over no commitment if U(k1) = p1(b− c1)−
k1(p2 + p3) > 0, or if:
β >
c1 − b · p1
b− b · p1 .
Therefore, if:
β > max{c1 − b · p1
b− b · p1 , 1−
c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
},
93
THE LIMITED POTENTIAL OF PARTIAL-COMMITMENT
the agent prefers perfect commitment. If:
β < 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
,
the agent prefers the stronger commitment level k = k2 over k = k1. The agent prefers
k2 over no commitment if p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)− k2p3 > 0, which is the case if:
β >
c1
p3b
+ c2 − c1 − b
b
· p2 + p3
p3
.
Overall, the agent prefers stronger than perfect commitment if:
β ∈
(
c1
p3b
+ c2 − c1 − b
b
· p2 + p3
p3
, 1− c2 − c1
b
p2 + p3
p2
)
.
B.0.7 Lemma 2.4
Assume b(β − β) > c2 − c1. In this case, the agent has too much uncertainty for there
to be a commitment device that ensures a certain response to each cost realization. No
commitment gives zero payoff, and full commitment gives b− E(c) < 0. There are three
intermediate commitment levels to consider: choosing k2 = c2−βb ensures that the agent
will complete the task with certainty if c ∈ {c1, c2} but never if c = c3. This gives the
expected payoff:
U(k2) = p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)− k2p3 = p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)− (c2 − βb)p3.
But the agent now has to choose between completing the task with certainty if c = c1,
by choosing k1 = c1− βb, but then having a perceived positive probability of completing
the task even for c = c2, which gives the payoff:
U(k1) = p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)Pr(bβ − c2 > −k1)− k1
(
p2(1− Pr(bβ − c2 > −k1) + p3
)
= p1(b− c1) + p2(b− c2)
(
1− c2 − c1
b(β − β)
)
− (c1 − βb)
(
p2
c2 − c1
b(β − β) + p3
)
,
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or ensuring the task is never completed for c = c2, but then having a perceived positive
probability of not completing even if c = c1. This can be achieved with the fee k1 = c2−bβ,
and will give the agent an expected payoff of:
U(k1) = p1(b− c1)Pr(bβ − c1 > −k1)− k1(1− p1Pr(bβ − c1 > −k1))
= p1(b− c1) c2 − c1
b(β − β) − (c2 − bβ)
(
1− p1 c2 − c1
b(β − β)
)
.
Given the assumptions c1 < b < c2 and b(β− β) > c2− c1, it is no longer possible for the
agent to construct a commitment device that ensures perfect commitment in expectation.
Therefore, the agent expects to complete the task with higher or lower likelihood than a
time-consistent agent.
For the case of certain commitment to completing the task for both c1 and c2, there is
no effect of changing β, but the valuation is increasing in β. This implies that becoming
overconfident raises value of strong commitment, if this overconfidence comes through
raising the floor on beliefs about β. This effect comes entirely from the reduction in
the fee k that is necessary to ensure the desired behavior. For the commitment device
insuring the task is always completed for c = c1, increasing β has ambiguous effects, while
increasing β makes this commitment device strictly more desirable. That is, increasing
overconfidence increases the value of this commitment device. Again it is the reduction
in fee that dominates. Increasing β leads the agent to attach a higher probability to
the task being completed too often, when c = c2, but this implies incurring the fee k1
less often, and the later effect dominates. Finally for the lowest intermediate level of
commitment, the value is increasing in β but ambiguous in β. Increasing β here has an
effect through decreasing the agent’s uncertainty, and decreasing the range of β for which
the agent would have to forgo completing the task for c1 to avoid it being completed for
c2. Intuitively, the agent gets closer to the first scenario with complete separation.
B.0.8 Learning about Naivete
There are two possible levels of intermediate commitment that the agent would consider:
k = c − β and k = c − β, where the first only ensure the task will be completed for c if
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β = β, and otherwise not. k ensures the task will be completed whenever c = c and is
therefore uninformative. The one-period payoff from picking k is:
U(k) = p(1− g)(b− c)− (c− β)(1− p(1− g)) < 0,
which is negative by assumption, along with the payoff from picking the higher commit-
ment level:
U(k) = p(b− c)− (c− β)(1− p) < 0.
These assumptions ensure that a myopic agent would pick no commitment in every period.
These two assumptions are equivalent to the following restrictions on β:
β <
c− b · p
b− b · p and β <
c− b(1− g)p
b− b(1− g)p.
For learning to be potentially valuable, knowing ones type has to possibly change the
optimal action. Since no commitment is preferred over k, the agent would choose no
commitment if the agent was certain that β = β. Therefore, it must be that knowing
β = β would lead the agent to choose intermediate commitment.
Intermediate commitment being preferred over no commitment if β = β corresponds to
the following condition:
U(k) = p(b− c)− (c− β)(1− p) > 0.
Therefore, the agent will experiment and choose k = k if:
p(1− g)(b− c+ (b− c))− (1− p(1− g))(c− βb+ δ0) > 0 + δ0.
Given δ = 1, this means that the agent prefers experimentation if:
β >
c− b(1− g)p− (b− c)p(1− g)
b− b(1− g)p .
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Overall, if:
β ∈
{
c− b(1− g)p− (b− c)p(1− g)
b− b(1− g)p ,
c− b(1− g)p
b− b(1− g)p
}
,
the agent would engage in costly experimentation. To ensure the agent would never
complete the task absent a commitment device, βb − c < 0 also has to hold. Therefore,
β < c
b
is also needed. I find that:
c
b
>
c− b(1− g)p
b− b(1− g)p ⇔ b > c,
which means that if:
β ∈
{
c− b(1− g)p− (b− c)p(1− g)
b− b(1− g)p ,
c− b(1− g)p
b− b(1− g)p
}
,
and
β <
c− b · p
b− b · p.
Experimentation is considered worthwhile for the agent. If the upper bounds are satis-
fied but not the lower bound on β, then the agent will not experiment. If g increases
(probability of having a severe self-control problem increases), holding everything else
fixed, the range of β for which experimentation is optimal decreases. However, under the
assumption that partial commitment is optimal for β = β, increasing the spread on the
beliefs over present-bias increases the likelihood of experimentation being optimal.
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Appendix C
Procrastination and Learning about Self-Control
If U I(x; 1) > U I(x; 0), the time-inconsistent agent will complete the task in periods
t = T − nτ where n ∈ N0. By Assumption 3.1, the time-inconsistent type will acquire
information in period t = T − 1 and complete the task in period t = T . In period
t = T − 2, acquiring information means that the task will be completed with perceived
probability q in t = T − 1 and with (1 − q) in t = T . Postponing means information
will be acquired with certainty at t = T − 1 and completed with certainty at t = T .
Therefore, the time-inconsistent agent will postpone information acquisition if:
−m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 2) < −mD(1) + U I(x; 2)
⇔ q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) > m(1−D(1)).
Given that this inequality and τ > 2 hold, then in t = T − 3, acquiring information
immediately means the task will be completed in the next period with probability q, but
the task will only be completed in period t = T with probability 1 − q. If the time-
inconsistent agent postpones now, she believes that the information will be acquired in
the next period with probability q and the task will be completed in two periods from
now with probability q, but with probability 1 − q the information will be acquired in
period t = T − 1 and the task will be completed in t = T . The time-inconsistent type
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will therefore postpone information acquisition if:
−m+ qU I(x; 1) + (1− q)U I(x; 3)
<q(−mD(1) + U I(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−mD(2) + U I(x; 3))
⇔ q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) + (1− qD(1))m > +(1− q)D(3)m.
In general, when τ ≤ τ , the time-inconsistent type will postpone acquiring information if
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) + (1− qD(1))m > (1− q)D(τ − 1)m.
The RHS of this inequality is increasing in τ , so if q(U I(x; 2)−U I(x; 1))+m(1−D(1)) > 0
the time-inconsistent agent will postpone information acquisition for at least τ periods.
A sufficient condition for the time-inconsistent agent to procrastinate for τ periods is
U I(x; 2) > U I(x; 1).
In t = T − τ − 1, the time-inconsistent type knows that if she acquires information, the
task will be completed with certainty in the next period, hence her expected payoff is
UˆT−τ−1(sT−τ−1 = 1) = −m+ U I(x; 1).
If she chooses not to acquire information, she knows that the time-consistent agent will
acquire information in the next period, but the time-inconsistent agent will only acquire
information in t = T − 1. Hence, her expected payoff is
UˆT−τ−1(sT−τ−1 = 0) = q(−mD(1) + U I(x; 2)) + (1− q)(−mD(τ) + U I(x; τ + 1)).
Hence, she will prefer not acquiring the information in t = T − τ − 1 if
q(U I(x; 2)− U I(x; 1)) + (1− qD(1))m > (1− q)(D(τ)m+ U I(x; 1)− U I(x; τ + 1)).
When q approaches 1, this reduces to the previous condition. Whether this condition is
generally stronger or weaker than the previous one is not clear. If this assumption holds,
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however, the agent will procrastinate for an additional τ periods. This follows from the
same argument as before.
By induction, for each t = T −nτ such that t ≥ 1 and n ∈ N0, we need to check whether
the agent will prefer to acquire information or not. The agent is always comparing
acquiring information now and completing the task with certainty tomorrow to the case
where the time-inconsistent type will procrastinate until the second to last period and
the time-consistent type will acquire information in the next period. Therefore, if
q(U I(x; 2)−U I(x; 1)) + (1− qD(1))m ≥ max
n,k∈N
(1− q)(D(nτ)m−U I(x;nτ + k) +U I(x; k))
where τ = min{T,min{τ |U I(x; τ) ≥ U I(x; 0)}}, then the time-inconsistent agent will
procrastinate information acquisition for any t < T − 1. Note also that, given this con-
dition, we have derived the time-inconsistent type’s learning decision in all continuation
games and the equilibrium outcome has been pined down uniquely.
C.0.1 Derivations of Example 3.1.
For D(t) = 11+rtδ
t with r = 12 and δ = 1, D(t) =
2
2+t . Then Assumption 3.1 is satisfied if
U I(x; 0) = −c+ 23b > 0, U I(x; 1) = −23c+ 24b > m = 0, and UC(x; 0) = −c+ b > m = 0.
The strongest of these conditions is U I(x; 0) = −c+ 23b > 0 ⇔ bc > 32 .
Inequality (3.3) can then be written as:
q
(
−24c+
2
5b+
2
3c−
2
4b
)
> (1− q)
(
−23c+
2
4b
)
⇔ q
(
−24c+
2
5b
)
> −23c+
2
4b
⇔ q > −
2
3c+
2
4b
−24c+ 25b
= −20c+ 15b−15c+ 12b.
Note that −24c + 25b > 0 ⇔ bc > 54 , which is ensured by the assumption of bc > 32 .
Plugging b
c
= 2315 gives q >
15
17 .
For m
c
= 13 , Assumption 3.1 is satisfied if U
I(x; 0) = −c + 23b > 0, U I(x; 1) = −23c +
2
4b > m =
c
3 , and U
C(x; 0) = −c + b > m = c3 . The strongest of these conditions is
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U I(x; 1) = −23c+ 24b > c3 ⇔ bc > 2.
Then, Inequality 3.3 can then be written as:
q
(
−24c+
2
5b+
2
3c−
2
4b
)
+ c3
(
1− q23
)
> (1− q)
(
−23c+
2
4b
)
⇔ q
(
−24c+
2
5b−
2
9c
)
> −23c+
2
4b−
1
3c
⇔ q > −c+
2
4b
−1318c+ 25b
= −90c+ 45b−65c+ 36b.
Note that −1318c + 25b > 0 ⇔ bc > 6536 , which is ensured by the assumption bc > 2.
Plugging b
c
= 9145 gives q >
5
39 .
C.0.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.
This follows immediately from the derivations in the main text and comparing the per-
ceived utility of choosing each action.
C.0.3 Derivations of Examples 3.2 and 3.3.
Time-Consitent Type: Inequality (3.6) can also be written in the following form:
Time-Inconsitent Type: Condition 3.6 can also be written in the following form:
For there to exist parameters b, c such that no information is simultaneously preferred
over taking x′ and over taking x. The following is required:
q >
(b′ −m(1 + 2r))(1 + 3r)2
c r2 + (b′ −mr)(1 + 3r)(1 + 2r) .
For there to exist parameters b, c such that no information is simultaneously preferred
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over taking x′ and over acquiring information. The following is required:
q >
b′(1 + r)(1 + 3r)
(c r +m(1 + 3r))(1 + 2r) .
In our examples r = 12 . Therefore, condition C.0.3 reduces to:
q >
25b′ − 50m
c+ 20b′ − 10m.
And condition C.0.3 reduces to:
q >
15b′
4c+ 20m.
Overall, from Condition 3.6 and Condition 3.5 we have:
1− m
b′
> q > max
{
m
b− c− b′ ,
25b′ − 50m
c+ 20b′ − 10m,
15b′
4c+ 20m
}
Example 3.2: Since m = 0 and δ = 1, condition 3.5 is satisfied and condition C.0.3 is
binding. Plugging m = 0 into C.0.3 directly gives:
q > max
{
25b′
c+ 20b′ ,
15b′
4c
}
.
Example 3.3: For m = c50 , b′ =
c
10 , and δ = 1 condition C.0.3 is satisfied if:
4
5 > q > max
{
1
50 b
c
− 55 ,
15
28 ,
15
44
}
.
Therefore, if:
4
5 >
1
50 b
c
− 55 ⇔
b
c
>
9
8 .
There will exist a range of q such that the time-consistent agent acquires information
immediately, and the time-inconsistent agent will take no action indefinitely. Overall, the
conditions for existence of such an equilibrium are: For b
c
∈
(
9
8 ,
3
2
)
the time-consistent
agent acquires information immediately, and the time-inconsistent agent will take no
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action indefinitely if:
4
5 > q > max
{
1
50 b
c
− 55 ,
15
28
}
.
C.0.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4.
(i) As in the main text, the assumptions ensure that a time-inconsistent type never
works on the task once she learns that her ability is aL. However, from her t = 0
perspective, she wants to complete the task. Also, because maxτ U It (bˆ; τ) = U It (bˆ; 1) >
0 and hence maxτ UCt (bˆ; τ) = UCt (bˆ; 1) > 0, without learning own ability, both types
would immediately learn own self-control and then complete the task. Therefore, such
an equilibrium exists.
(ii) In this case, each type of agent never works on the task once she learns that her ability
is aL. Since information regarding ability is valuable, a time-consistent type chooses to
learn in t = 0. As q → 1, a time-inconsistent type also (wrongly) believes that, almost
surely, she will behave as if she would be time-consistent. Precisely, if Inequality (3.3)
holds, then both time-consistent and time-inconsistent types strictly prefer to acquire
information about own ability in t = 0. Then, the equilibrium behavior for each type in
t ≥ 1 is exactly the same as in Section 3.4.
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